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Saving Subchapter K  
SUBSTANCE, SHATTERED CEILINGS, AND THE PROBLEM 
OF CONTRIBUTED PROPERTY 
Andrea Monroe† 
Partnerships are unique in the world of federal income taxation. 
Unlike individuals and other taxable entities, a partnership is not a 
taxpayer.1 Rather, its partners are the taxpayers. Accordingly, a 
partnership must allocate the income and other items generated by its 
operations among its partners for inclusion on their federal income tax 
returns.2 The rules governing these allocations, set forth in Section 704 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, are the operational lifeblood of partnership 
taxation, dictating who receives such allocations, as well as their amount 
and timing. 
Partnership allocations are equally critical as a theoretical matter, 
encapsulating the ideals underlying Subchapter K, which governs the 
taxation of partners and partnerships. Particularly foundational is the 
equitable requirement that transactions have “substance,” such that the 
tax consequences resulting from a transaction parallel the economic 
consequences resulting from the same transaction.3 I call this 
fundamental principle the “Substance Principle.”  
Flexibility is also vital to Subchapter K. The rules governing 
partnerships cover an incredibly broad spectrum of business 
arrangements, from the most rudimentary to the most sophisticated, and 
Subchapter K must provide malleable rules to accommodate these 
diverse commercial relationships. To that end, Section 704 
  
 †  Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Temple University; J.D. University of Michigan 
Law School; L.LM. in Taxation, New York University School of Law. Many thanks to Alice Abreu, 
Jane Baron, Robert Bartow, Craig Green, Doug Kahn, Kathy Mandelbaum, Dianne Sehler, and 
Daniel Simmons for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Sean Basquil, Brian Kallio, Karl 
Thomas Jonsson, Robert Kane, and Genevieve Loutinsky for marvelous research assistance.  
 1 I.R.C. § 701 (2006).  
 2 Id. § 702(a). 
 3 The Substance Principle relates to horizontal equity, rather than vertical equity. 
Similarly situated taxpayers can only be treated alike when the tax and economic consequences of a 
transaction match one another. Put another way, the Substance Principle aims to ensure that the right 
taxpayer pays tax on the right amount at the right time. Accordingly, the Substance Principle focuses 
on the partner’s ultimate tax liability, reflecting the interaction between the partnership’s internal 
allocations and such partner’s extra-partnership tax attributes.  
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presumptively allows partners to organize their enterprises and share its 
economic profits and losses in any manner that is sensible and efficient.4 
Section 704 is in crisis. The number of business entities electing 
to be governed by Subchapter K is skyrocketing.5 Yet the enforcement 
resources dedicated to Subchapter K remain woefully insufficient.6 And a 
recent statutory enactment has rendered portions of Section 704 
unsustainably complex. More troubling, this crisis threatens the integrity 
of Subchapter K. Undue complexity in partnership allocations impairs 
the operation of many partnership provisions, thereby reducing 
Subchapter K’s administrability and coherence. In addition, this 
complexity creates numerous opportunities for tax sheltering among 
partners, the costs of which are borne by the public at large.    
The source of the partnership allocation crisis is Congress’s 
desire to harmonize flexibility and the Substance Principle. Indeed, the 
most foundational issue in Subchapter K is how to reconcile these ideals 
and, more importantly, how to respond when no such reconciliation is 
possible.7 Congress has sought to maximize partnership flexibility while 
  
 4 I.R.C. § 704(a), (b). A partner’s distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction and 
credit is determined by the partnership agreement to the extent the partnership’s allocations have 
substantial economic effect. For a discussion of the substantial economic effect safe harbor, see infra 
Part I.A. 
 5 Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns, 2005, 27 STAT. INCOME BULL. 
69, 70 fig.B (2007). The number of partnerships grew by 8.5% in 2005, the most recent year for 
which partnership return information is available. Indeed, the number of partnerships has increased 
at an average annual rate of 5.8% since 1995. Id. at 69 fig.A. This increase is due in large measure to 
the explosive growth of limited liability companies (“LLCs”). For the fourth consecutive year, LLCs 
grew more than all other entity types, increasing by 15.4% in 2005. Id. at 75. Indeed, since 1995, the 
number of limited liability companies has grown by more than 1,100% (approximately 119,000 
returns filed by LLCs in 1995 versus 1,465,000 returns filed by LLCs in 2005). Id.; STAFF OF JT. 
COMM. ON TAX’N, TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES RELATING TO SMALL BUSINESS 
AND CHOICE OF ENTITY at 11 (JCX-48-08) (June 4, 2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-48-
08.pdf. 
 6 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 2007 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/2008_enforcement.pdf. In 2008, the 
Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) examined .42% of all partnership returns (13,203 partnership 
returns examined and 3,146,994 partnership returns filed in 2007 calendar year). Id. Since 1998, the 
Service has examined an average of .36% of all partnership returns annually. Id. In addition, with 
few exceptions, the percentage of partnership returns examined since 1998 has been lower than the 
percentage of any other type of income tax return examined for such year. Id. The only exception is 
S corporation returns for the 2003 through 2005 fiscal years, but the difference is never larger than 
.06%. Id. (For 2003 through 2005, the Service examined .35%, .26%, and .33% of all S corporation 
returns and it examined .30%, .19%, and .30% of all partnership returns.); see also Lawrence 
Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX 
REV. 249, 252 (1999) [hereinafter Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K] (“[M]any tax practitioners 
believe that very few IRS auditors of partnership returns understand enough of subchapter K to 
challenge partnership accounting for items subject to the more complicated aspects of subchapter K 
. . . . This perception diminishes taxpayers’ incentives to try their best to comply in any but the 
largest of transactions.”).   
 7 The conflict between flexibility and the Substance Principle parallels the foundational 
theoretical conflict between aggregate and entity principles underlying Subchapter K more broadly. 
The entity theory treats the partnership as an entity separate and distinct from its partners. By 
contrast, the aggregate theory treats the partnership as nothing more than the aggregate of its 
partners. Many commentators believe that the tension between aggregate and entity principles is the 
primary source of conflict in Subchapter K. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution of 
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simultaneously complying with the Substance Principle, and, to some 
extent, it has succeeded. But Congress has shown a decided preference 
for flexibility, even at the price of sacrificing the Substance Principle, in 
those instances where flexibility and the Substance Principle are 
impossible to reconcile.  
Partnership contributions and the allocations attributable to 
contributed property present precisely this formidable challenge, and this 
Article proposes a solution to the conflict. The rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property, set forth in Section 
704(c), have a long, dynamic history marked by the failure to reconcile 
flexibility and the Substance Principle. With some variation, the Section 
704(c) allocation regime has followed a flexible, choice-based model that 
often tolerates, and sometimes mandates, breaches of the Substance 
Principle. This approach has significantly complicated partnership 
allocations and facilitated various tax shelter transactions.8 Yet Congress 
has remained steadfast in its commitment to flexibility. 
The time has come, however, for Congress to decide which 
policy—flexibility or the Substance Principle—lies at the heart of 
Subchapter K. Congress recently enacted Section 704(c)(1)(C), which 
withdraws certain allocations from the historic Section 704(c) regime 
and requires that such allocations be made in a manner entirely 
consistent with the Substance Principle.9 Despite Congress’s laudable 
intentions, Section 704(c)(1)(C) is a disaster. This flawed provision has 
rendered the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed 
property wholly unworkable, thereby increasing the complexity of 
partnership allocations and Subchapter K generally. Indeed, Subchapter 
K can no longer support Congress’s overdrawn loyalty to flexibility.10 
Thus, it is time for Congress to enact a mandatory rule governing all 
allocations attributable to contributed property, and that rule should 
reflect Congress’s renewed commitment to the Substance Principle. That 
rule is the deferred sales method. 
Part I of this Article traces the history of the rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property and their evolving 
relationship to the Substance Principle. This part also illustrates how the 
current Section 704(c) allocation regime permits income and loss shifting 
among partners, allowing tax sheltering that ultimately imposes costs on 
  
Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. REV. 343, 344 (2003); Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership 
Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV. 365, 369 (2003) [hereinafter Lokken, As the World Turns].   
 8 See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 
2006), rev’g 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004); Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 
(RIA) 2005-104.  
 9 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833(a), 188 Stat. 1418 
(2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)).  
 10 For a thoughtful discussion of the cost of Congress’s commitment to flexibility, see 
Lokken, Future Without Subchapter K, supra note 6, at 271-72. 
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the public.11 Part II discusses my proposed solution to the crisis created 
by Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment, the deferred sales method, and 
suggests that adopting this allocation methodology would reduce abuse, 
increase coherence and, most importantly, simplify Subchapter K. Part 
III examines several objections to the deferred sales method, and 
concludes that such objections are especially unpersuasive in light of 
modern circumstances. Indeed, this part concludes that the deferred sales 
method is entirely consistent with the broader shift in Subchapter K 
towards the Substance Principle when necessary to promote equity and 
prevent abuse.   
I. THE IMPOSSIBLE BALANCING ACT: SECTION 704(C) 
ALLOCATIONS 
A. The Problem of Contributed Property 
The Section 704 allocation rules are absolutely fundamental to 
the theory and practice of Subchapter K. Absent these rules, Subchapter 
K would lack any mechanism for delivering the income, gain, loss, 
deduction, and credit generated by a partnership to the real taxpayers, its 
partners. Partnership allocations also serve as the guardian of the 
Substance Principle in Subchapter K. Whether or not the right taxpayer 
pays tax on the right amount at the right time, as required by the 
Substance Principle, depends entirely on the Section 704 allocation rules.  
Yet Congress created a formidable challenge by insisting that 
these allocation rules promote both flexibility and the Substance 
Principle. Congress’s goal was to create allocation rules sufficiently 
flexible so as to permit partners to share the fruits of their enterprise in 
any manner consistent with commercial expectations while 
simultaneously ensuring compliance with the Substance Principle. In 
addition, such allocation rules were to be simple and have a low potential 
for abuse.    
To a great extent, Congress achieved its goal with the elegant 
general allocation rule set forth in Section 704(b) as interpreted by 
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”). Section 704(b) provides that a 
partnership may allocate items among its partners based on the terms of 
its partnership agreement so long as such allocations have substantial 
economic effect.12 Thus, a partnership’s allocations must have substantial 
  
 11 Section 704(c) is, alas, highly technical, and thus my discussion necessarily requires 
examination of the way these rules operate in practice. To make this analysis more accessible, I use a 
series of simple examples intended to expose breaches of the Substance Principle and the income 
and loss shifting potential of these rules. Impatient readers may wish to skip to Part II.  
 12 I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2006). Congress enacted the substantial economic effect rules in 
1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213(d), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). The substantial 
economic effect rules operate as a safe harbor. If an allocation has substantial economic effect, 
thereby falling within the safe harbor, such allocation will be respected as drafted. By contrast, if an 
allocation lacks substantial economic effect or the partnership agreement fails to provide allocations, 
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economic effect in order to be respected. Congress, however, left the 
challenging task of defining the term “substantial economic effect” to 
Treasury. 
In 1983, Treasury proposed regulations interpreting Section 
704(b) and its substantial economic effect requirement.13 Heavily 
influenced by the Substance Principle, substantial economic effect 
requires, among other things, that a partnership’s allocations be 
consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of the partners.14 
Indeed, the tax consequences of a transaction must parallel the economic 
consequences of such transaction. If a partnership allocates a tax item to 
a partner, the allocation will only be respected for federal income tax 
purposes if the partner also receives the economic benefit or burden that 
corresponds to such allocation. 
For purposes of Subchapter K, a partner’s tax investment and 
economic investment in a partnership are measured separately. A 
partner’s economic investment is measured by a set of financial records 
called the “capital account.”15 The balance in a partner’s capital account 
represents the amount that she is entitled to receive on the liquidation of 
the partnership or her interest therein.16 Any economic benefit or burden 
borne by a partner must be reflected in an adjustment to her capital 
account, referred to as a book allocation.17 A partner’s capital account 
  
then a partner’s distributive share of the relevant item will be determined based on the partner’s 
interest in the partnership. I.R.C. § 704(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (as amended in 2008). Little 
guidance exists on the partner’s interest in the partnership and, therefore, prudent practitioners 
typically draft allocations to comply with the substantial economic effect safe harbor. See WILLIAM 
S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 11.02[3] (4th 
ed. 2007). Accordingly, this Article assumes that a partnership drafts all allocations to comply with 
the substantial economic effect safe harbor.  
 13 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (Mar. 9, 1983). Allocations possess 
substantial economic effect if the following threshold requirements are satisfied: (1) the allocations 
have economic effect and (2) the economic effect of the allocations is substantial. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). 
 14 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (defining economic effect). A partnership’s 
allocation will have economic effect if the partnership agreement provides that (1) the partners’ 
capital accounts are determined and maintained in accordance with the rules set forth in Treasury 
Regulation section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv), (2) liquidating distributions are made in accordance with the 
partners’ positive capital account balances, and (3) the partnership agreement includes a deficit 
restoration obligation. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b). 
  The economic effect of an allocation is substantial if there is a reasonable possibility 
that such allocation will affect substantially the dollar amounts that the partners will receive from the 
partnership, independent of tax consequences. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii). More specifically, the 
economic effect of an allocation is not substantial if (1) the after-tax economic consequences, 
determined on a present value basis, of at least one partner may be enhanced when compared to the 
consequences if the allocation were not included in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a 
strong likelihood that the after-tax consequences, determined on a present value basis, of no partner 
will be diminished when compared to the consequences if the allocation were not included in the 
partnership agreement. Id. A detailed discussion of the substantiality requirement is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For a thoughtful discussion of such requirement, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 
12, ¶ 11.02[2][b].  
 15 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(1).  
 16 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2).  
 17 Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
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balance and the book allocations made thereto serve as Subchapter K’s 
proxy for the economic arrangement between the partners.18    
The capital account thus functions as the benchmark against 
which the partnership’s tax allocations are measured. A partner’s basis in 
her partnership interest, referred to as her “outside basis,” reflects her tax 
investment in the enterprise and must parallel the partner’s capital 
account. To illustrate, if a partnership allocates one dollar of taxable 
income to a partner, then she should be entitled to receive one additional 
economic dollar on liquidation, and her capital account should be 
increased accordingly.19 Simply put, tax allocations possess substantial 
economic effect to the extent that they are made to the same partner, in 
the same amount, and at the same time as the corresponding book 
allocations are reflected in such partner’s capital account.  
Through this application of Section 704(b) and its corresponding 
regulations, Treasury achieves a sensible balance between flexibility and 
the Substance Principle. Partners are free to organize their business in 
whatever manner best suits their commercial expectations and to share 
the economic benefits and burdens of the venture accordingly. So long as 
the partnership allocates its tax items in parallel with its economic items, 
any sharing arrangements provided in the partnership agreement will be 
respected. Partnerships are thus permitted maximum flexibility in 
structuring their allocations within the collar of the Substance Principle. 
The Internal Revenue Service assumes the role of referee in what is 
essentially an intra-partnership matter, determining only whether 
partnership allocations exceed the boundaries of the substantial economic 
effect safe harbor.  
Consider the consequences if several individuals form a 
partnership. The partners contribute equal amounts of cash to the 
partnership, and agree to share all profits, losses and the corresponding 
tax items ratably. The cash contributions are immediately reflected in 
each partner’s capital account and outside basis.20 If the partnership uses 
the contributed cash to purchase property, then the partners would share 
any gains or losses subsequently recognized on such property equally for 
both tax purposes and book purposes. Accordingly, each partner’s capital 
account and outside basis, operating in tandem, would be increased or 
decreased by her ratable share of the recognized gain or loss attributable 
  
 18 For a thoughtful discussion of the importance of capital accounts to Subchapter K, see 
Daniel L. Simmons, Built-In Gain and Built-In Loss Property on Formation of a Partnership: An 
Exploration of the Grand Elegance of Partnership Capital Accounts, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 
Winter, 2009) (on file with author).  
 19 Similarly, if a partnership allocates one dollar of taxable loss to a partner, then she 
should be entitled to receive one less economic dollar on liquidation, and her capital account should 
be reduced accordingly. 
 20 I.R.C. § 722 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d). 
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to the property.21 And these tax allocations would possess substantial 
economic effect. 
Were this partnership to liquidate following the disposition of its 
property, each partner would be entitled to a distribution equal to the 
positive balance in her capital account.22 The capital accounts would 
reflect each partner’s initial economic investment in the partnership 
adjusted by her share of the partnership’s gains or losses subsequently 
recognized with respect to the property. Likewise, each partner’s outside 
basis in her partnership interest would equal her adjusted capital account 
balance. The tax burden of each dollar earned by the partnership would 
fall on the partner who received the economic benefit of such earnings as 
reflected in her liquidating distribution. Throughout the life of the 
partnership, the tax allocations would have paralleled the book 
allocations, thus operating in harmony with the Substance Principle. The 
right partner would have paid tax on the right amount at the right time.  
The balance between flexibility and the Substance Principle 
reflected in Section 704(b) dissolves when a partner contributes property 
to a partnership.23 Under current law, such contribution transaction is 
treated differently for book purposes and tax purposes. The result is a 
“book/tax disparity” between the contributing partner’s capital account 
and her outside basis in her partnership interest. From an economic 
perspective, the partner contributes property with a specific fair market 
value to the partnership, and, subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the 
venture, is entitled to receive such fair market value on the liquidation of 
the partnership. Accordingly, the contributing partner’s initial capital 
account equals the fair market value of the property at contribution, and 
the contributed property’s book value to the partnership similarly equals 
its fair market value.24     
By contrast, from a tax perspective, a contribution of property to 
a partnership is a nonrecognition event. Thus, a contributing partner 
recognizes no gain or loss when she contributes property to a 
partnership.25 Rather, any precontribution gain or loss is preserved for 
future recognition. Consistent with nonrecognition treatment, certain 
transferred basis provisions treat the decision to exchange property for a 
partnership interest as follows: the contributing partner’s outside basis in 
her partnership interest equals her basis in the contributed property at 
  
 21 I.R.C. § 705(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
 22 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2). 
 23 As will be discussed, the problem of contributed property emerges when the 
contributing property’s basis and fair market value differ at contribution. If the contributed 
property’s fair market value equals its basis, no such problem will arise.  
 24 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(1). If the contributed property is encumbered, the 
contributing partner’s initial capital account would equal the fair market value of the property 
reduced by any liabilities that the partnership assumes or takes the property subject to. For purposes 
of this Article and the examples contained herein, it is assumed that any property contributed to a 
partnership is free of liabilities. 
 25 I.R.C. § 721(a).  
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contribution,26 and the partnership’s basis in the contributed property, 
referred to as “inside basis,” is the partner’s basis in the property at 
contribution.27 
The foregoing regime yields different treatment of 
precontribution gains and losses for book and tax purposes. In 
calculating the partner’s capital account, the contributed property is 
valued as though it had been sold at contribution.28 Indeed, the 
contributing partner receives credit in her capital account for any 
increase or decrease in the property’s value generated prior to 
contribution. For tax purposes, however, such precontribution gains or 
losses are not recognized; they are simply transferred and preserved 
through Subchapter K’s basis rules.29  
To illustrate, consider the following example, “Example 1,” 
which will be referred to throughout this Article. A and B form an equal 
partnership, with A contributing $200 cash and B contributing Blackacre. 
The partnership agreement provides that A and B will share all items of 
income, gain, loss, and deduction equally. At formation, Blackacre’s fair 
market value is $200, and its basis is $300, the amount B paid to acquire 
the property.  
Blackacre’s book value when contributed is $200, its fair market 
value. Each partner’s capital account is credited with $200 to reflect the 
fair market value of such partner’s contribution. In this sense, B 
immediately bears the economic loss attributable to her precontribution 
ownership of Blackacre.30 B purchased Blackacre for $300, yet her 
capital account reflects only Blackacre’s diminished value of $200.  
For tax purposes, Blackacre’s $100 built in loss is not recognized 
on contribution. A takes an outside basis of $200 in her partnership 
interest, B takes an outside basis of $300 in her partnership interest, and 
the partnership takes an inside basis of $300 in Blackacre. By 
transferring B’s basis in Blackacre, the property’s $100 precontribution 
loss is preserved for future recognition.31     
  
 26 I.R.C. § 722. 
 27 I.R.C. § 723.  
 28 Because it characterizes the contribution transaction as an exchange between the 
contributing partner and the partnership itself, this capital account treatment of partnership 
contributions reflects the entity theory of partnerships. 
 29 The tax treatment of partnership contributions reflects the aggregate theory of 
partnerships. The contribution transaction is characterized as an exchange among the partners. In 
exchange for an undivided interest in the contributed property, the contributing partner receives an 
undivided interest in the property contributed by the other partners.  
 30 If the partnership were to liquidate immediately after formation, B would receive a 
$200 liquidating distribution. Accordingly, B would receive only $200 in liquidation of her initial 
$300 investment in Blackacre, thereby realizing a $100 economic loss. 
 31 Indeed, Blackacre’s $100 built in loss is preserved at two levels. First, the $100 built 
in loss is preserved in B’s outside basis in her partnership interest. The partnership interest is worth 
$200, but B’s outside basis is $300. Second, the loss is preserved in the partnership’s inside basis in 
Blackacre. Blackacre’s fair market value is $200, yet the partnership’s inside basis is $300. 
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What results is an immediate book/tax disparity. B’s outside 
basis in her partnership interest is $300, but her capital account is $200. 
Put another way, B bears the $100 economic loss attributable to 
Blackacre’s precontribution decline in the value, as reflected in her 
capital account, yet the corresponding tax loss is deferred for future 
recognition.  
The contribution transaction effectively unhinges the tax 
treatment of contributed property from the corresponding book 
treatment, thereby breaching the Substance Principle and creating the 
potential for abuse. When future taxable events occur, such as a sale of 
the contributed property, the book consequences and the tax 
consequences of such event will differ.32 Because the contributed 
property’s book value reflects the recognition of precontribution gains 
and losses, but its inside basis does not, future book gains and losses will 
necessarily differ from future tax gains and losses.33 For instance, if the 
partnership subsequently sells the contributed property, it would 
recognize different amounts of gain or loss for book and tax purposes. 
Accordingly, the partnership’s tax allocations would not equal its book 
allocations, and such tax allocations would not have substantial 
economic effect.    
To illustrate, consider the consequences in Example 1 if the 
partnership sells Blackacre for $200. Since there has been no 
postcontribution change in Blackacre’s value, the sale would generate no 
book gain or loss ($200 amount realized minus $200 book value). 
Consequently, each partner’s capital account would remain unchanged, 
continuing to reflect her initial $200 economic investment in the 
partnership. For tax purposes, however, the partnership would recognize 
a $100 loss on Blackacre’s sale ($200 amount realized minus $300 
basis).  
Now the partnership is faced with the problem of contributed 
property—how should it allocate the $100 tax loss between A and B? 
The allocation of the $100 tax loss cannot have substantial economic 
effect and, therefore, would not be respected as a proper allocation under 
Section 704(b). Substantial economic effect requires timely, parallel 
allocations of book and tax items, but identical allocations would be 
impossible after Blackacre’s sale. For book purposes, the sale of 
Blackacre would generate no gain or loss. Indeed, the $100 book loss 
corresponding to the $100 recognized tax loss was previously reflected in 
B’s capital account at contribution. Accordingly, the substantial 
  
 32 This assumes that the contributed property’s fair market value and basis are not equal 
at contribution. If the contributed property’s fair market value equaled its basis at contribution, the 
book consequences of future events would match the corresponding tax consequences.  
 33 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2008). Any book items realized will be 
reflected in each partner’s capital account. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g). By contrast, any tax items 
recognized will be reflected in each partner’s outside basis, but such tax items will not be 
contemporaneously reflected in each partner’s capital account. I.R.C. § 705(a) (2006).    
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economic effect rules provide no guidance as to how the partnership 
should allocate the $100 tax loss recognized on Blackacre’s sale.   
Congress enacted Section 704(c) in answer to this question, 
thereby providing partnerships with a regime governing allocations 
attributable to contributed property. Like the general allocation rules of 
Section 704(b), the goal was to create a regime that maximized flexibility 
while complying with the Substance Principle. Yet unlike these general 
allocation rules, this goal was impossible to achieve in the contributed 
property context.  
As the example indicates, the divergent treatment of the 
contribution transaction for book and tax purposes compromises the 
Substance Principle. From the time of contribution, the contributing 
partner has a book/tax disparity. That is, the contributing partner’s tax 
investment in the partnership, as reflected in her outside basis in her 
partnership interest, does not equal her economic investment in the 
partnership, as reflected in her capital account. If the book/tax disparity 
results from a contribution of built in loss property, as in Example 1, then 
the contributing partner has borne the tax liability for dollars in excess of 
the amount that she would be entitled to receive on liquidation.34 By 
contrast, if the book/tax disparity results from the contribution of built in 
gain property, the contributing partner is entitled to receive dollars at 
liquidation for which she has yet to bear the corresponding tax liability.35 
As will be discussed infra, these breaches of the Substance Principle 
create the potential for abusive transactions, particularly transactions 
involving income and loss shifting.36    
These distortions can be remedied, and compliance with the 
Substance Principle can be restored, but only by sacrificing flexibility. 
The Substance Principle would command allocating all items attributable 
to contributed property in a manner sensitive to their precontribution or 
postcontribution nature. Precontribution tax items would be allocated to 
the contributing partner in order to match prior book allocations reflected 
in the contributing partner’s capital account at contribution. By contrast, 
postcontribution tax items would be allocated among the partners 
consistent with each partner’s postcontribution economic interest in such 
property, as set forth in the partnership agreement. These allocations 
would eliminate the book/tax disparities created at contribution, thereby 
preventing abuse and ensuring that the tax consequences attributable to 
  
 34 To illustrate, B made a $300 after-tax investment in Blackacre, but that investment 
only entitles her to receive $200 on liquidation of the partnership. Accordingly, her tax investment 
exceeds her economic investment in the partnership.  
 35 To illustrate, consider a partner that contributes property with a fair market value of 
$500 and a basis of $100 to a partnership. The contributing partner will not recognize the property’s 
$400 built in gain at contribution. Her outside basis in her partnership interest will be $100, but her 
initial capital account will be $500. Put another way, she has made a $100 after-tax investment in the 
partnership, but she is entitled to receive $500 on liquidation. Thus, her economic investment 
exceeds her tax investment.  
 36 See infra Part I.C.1. 
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ownership of the contributed property ultimately parallel the 
corresponding economic consequences.   
But a rule entirely consistent with the Substance Principle would 
deny partnerships any flexibility in allocating items attributable to 
contributed property. A partnership would have to account for events 
occurring outside the partnership, particularly the precontribution 
ownership of property, when making allocations attributable to 
contributed property. Consequently, the partnership’s freedom in making 
intra-partnership allocations attributable to contributed property would 
be lost. Compliance with the Substance Principle would require a 
uniform and mandatory approach to these allocations. The partnerships 
would no longer have a choice between alternative methods of allocating 
precontribution gains and losses.  
Again, consider Example 1 and the allocation of the $100 
precontribution loss recognized on Blackacre’s sale. Consistent with the 
Substance Principle, the partnership would allocate the $100 
precontribution loss entirely to B, the contributing partner. This 
allocation, made after Blackacre’s disposition, would eliminate B’s 
book/tax disparity. B’s capital account would remain $200, and her 
outside basis in her partnership interest would decrease from $300 to 
$200.37 B would bear both the economic and the tax consequences 
attributable to her precontribution ownership of Blackacre and, as will be 
discussed infra, no improper loss shifting would occur.38 
Although it is impossible to reconcile flexibility and the 
Substance Principle within Section 704(c), it is possible to solve the 
problem of contributed property. The solution, however, would require 
Congress to make a very difficult choice between flexibility and the 
Substance Principle. Specifically, Congress would have to commit itself 
to the Substance Principle at the cost of flexibility. Congress has yet to 
make this choice, remaining steadfast in its commitment to flexibility. 
Nonetheless, Congress’s relationship with the Substance Principle has 
grown stronger throughout the years because of concerns regarding 
Section 704(c)’s inequity and potential for abuse. The remainder of this 
Part I discusses the evolution of the rules governing allocations 
attributable to contributed property, especially the developing role of the 
Substance Principle in Section 704(c).   
B. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 included the first 
comprehensive rules governing the taxation of partnerships and 
partners.39 As noted, Congress’s goal throughout Subchapter K was to 
  
 37 I.R.C. § 705(a)(2).  
 38  See infra Part I.B.2. (discussion of allocations not subject to the ceiling rule). 
 39 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 730, 68A Stat. 3 (1954). 
1392 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4 
provide flexible and fair rules consistent with the contemporary 
commercial expectations of persons doing business in partnership form. 
Grossly underestimating the cost of deviating from the Substance 
Principle, Congress’s initial formulation of the rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property reflected a strong 
preference for flexibility.  
1. The Default Rule: Entity-based Allocations  
The initial Section 704(c) allocation regime, set forth in Section 
704(c)(1) of the 1954 Code, made no distinction between allocations 
attributable to contributed property and allocations attributable to 
property generally.40 Disregarding the unique nature of precontribution 
gains and losses, Congress directed partnerships to allocate such 
precontribution items under the general allocations rules. Built in gains 
and losses were treated just like any other gain or loss, as if they had 
been generated during the period of time that the partnership, rather than 
the contributing partner, owned the property.41  
To illustrate, suppose that the partnership in Example 1 sells 
Blackacre for $200, its fair market value at contribution. As before, the 
sale would generate no book gain or loss ($200 amount realized minus 
$200 book value), and each partner’s capital account would remain 
unchanged.42 For tax purposes, however, the partnership would recognize 
a $100 loss on Blackacre’s sale ($200 amount realized minus $300 
basis). The partnership would allocate this tax loss just like any other 
taxable item, equally between A and B. Thus, the partnership would 
allocate $50 of the tax loss to A, thereby reducing her outside basis in her 
partnership interest from $200 to $150.43 Similarly, it would allocate the 
remaining $50 of the tax loss to B, which would reduce her outside basis 
from $300 to $250.  
  
 40 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1) (1954). Section 704(c)(1) provided that “depreciation, depletion, or 
gain or loss with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a partner shall . . . be allocated 
among the partners in the same manner as if such property had been purchased by the partnership.” 
This initial formulation of the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed property 
reflected the entity theory of partnerships. 
 41 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 66 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 380 (1954) (“For 
example, if a partner contributes to a partnership [built in gain] property . . . , the gain upon the sale 
of such property by the partnership will, . . . be taxable to each of the partners in accordance with his 
distributive share of gains in the identical manner as if the property had been purchased by the 
partnership.”). 
 42 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(3), (g) (as amended in 2008). Partnerships were not 
required to maintain capital accounts until Treasury proposed the substantial economic effect 
regulations in 1983. Accordingly, the 1954 Code’s partnership allocation provisions did not 
command the capital account analysis set forth in this example or Example 2, discussed infra Part 
I.B.3. Nonetheless, I include the capital account analysis in these examples to better highlight the 
flaws of Section 704(c), particularly its breaches of the Substance Principle and its potential for 
abuse.   
 43 I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(2006). 
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Table 1: Allocations Using Section 704(c)(1) of the 1954 Code 
 A B 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 300 
Sale of 
Blackacre 
0 (50) 0 (50) 
Ending 
Balance 
200 150 200 250 
 
The Section 704(c)(1) allocation rule violated the Substance 
Principle. In so doing, it perpetuated the distortions caused by the 
contribution transaction and created additional, equally problematic 
distortions. B bore the $100 precontribution economic loss at the time 
she contributed Blackacre, as reflected in her $200 capital account 
balance. But Congress’s allocation rule only would have allocated a $50 
tax loss to B, leaving her with a lingering $50 book/tax disparity ($200 
capital account versus $250 outside basis). The disposition of Blackacre 
was the only event that could have eliminated B’s book/tax disparity 
while she remained a partner. Yet after Blackacre’s sale, B still would 
have a book/tax disparity. And, as will be discussed, B would continue to 
have such book/tax disparity until the partnership liquidated or she 
disposed of her partnership interest. Simply put, the tax consequences of 
B’s precontribution ownership of Blackacre failed to parallel the 
corresponding economic consequences.  
A also would have a $50 book/tax disparity following 
Blackacre’s sale ($200 capital account versus $150 outside basis). A bore 
no portion of Blackacre’s precontribution economic loss, but the 
partnership would allocate her a portion of the corresponding tax loss. 
Like B, A’s book/tax disparity cannot be remedied while she remains a 
partner.  
In addition, A’s book/tax disparity would indicate that improper 
loss shifting, which will be discussed infra, has occurred.44 When the 
partnership allocated $50 of the tax loss recognized on Blackacre’s sale 
to A, it effectively would shift such precontribution loss from B to A. A 
would become the beneficiary of a $50 tax loss for which B had borne 
the corresponding economic loss at contribution. This allocation would 
allow A to improperly shelter $50 of otherwise taxable income.45 
  
 44 For a more detailed discussion of income and loss shifting, particularly the motivations 
for and public cost of such transactions, see infra Part I.C.1.  
 45 That is, the $50 tax loss attributable to Blackacre’s sale would offset $50 of income or 
gain that A otherwise would have included in taxable income for the year.  
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Accordingly, the right partner would not pay tax on the right amount at 
the right time.  
To some extent, these distortions were temporary. When the 
affected partner disposed of her partnership interest or the partnership 
liquidated, such transaction would eliminate the partner’s book/tax 
disparity and reverse any prior income or loss shifts. In Example 1, for 
instance, if the partnership liquidated after selling Blackacre, B would 
receive a liquidating distribution of $200 in accordance with the positive 
balance in her capital account. For tax purposes, B would recognize a 
$50 loss on such distribution ($200 distribution minus $250 outside 
basis), and this $50 loss would represent the portion of Blackacre’s $100 
precontribution loss that the partnership failed to allocate to her after the 
property’s sale.46 Thus, after liquidation, B would have borne Blackacre’s 
entire $100 precontribution tax loss, thereby matching the treatment of 
the property’s $100 precontribution economic loss, which was reflected 
in B’s capital account at contribution.47  
Notwithstanding their temporary nature, these breaches of the 
Substance Principle were incredibly problematic. As will be discussed 
infra, even temporary shifts of income and loss impose a significant cost 
on the public.48 In addition, the transactions necessary to eliminate the 
affected partner’s book/tax disparity and reverse the income or loss 
shifting—the liquidation of the partnership or the disposition of such 
partner’s partnership interest—may not occur for many years, if ever. 
Indeed, the more time that passed without such events occurring, the 
more these temporary problems resembled permanent distortions.  
Although this allocation approach violated the Substance 
Principle, Congress concluded that such approach was justified by its 
simplicity and conformity with commercial expectations.49 Congress 
believed that most partners expected to share precontribution gains and 
losses just like postcontribution gains and losses.50 If this prediction were 
  
 46 I.R.C. § 731(a)(2).  
 47 Similarly, A would recognize a $50 gain as a result of the liquidating distribution. Id. § 
731(a)(1). This $50 gain would offset the $50 shifted tax loss that the partnership allocated to A on 
Blackacre’s disposition, thereby realigning her economic and tax investment in the partnership. 
Indeed, Congress was well aware of the temporary nature of the distortions caused by Section 
704(c)(1). H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 66 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 380 (1954) (“While the rule 
may result in possible detriment (or gain) to noncontributing partners, it should be noted that there 
will, in general, be a corresponding loss (or gain) to such partners upon sale or disposition of their 
interest in the partnership.”). 
 48 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 49 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 66 (1954) (“This general treatment was adopted because of 
its extreme simplicity as contrasted with any other alternative and because it conforms to the usual 
expectations of partners.”); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 380 (1954). 
 50 Commentators shared Congress’s opinion of contemporary commercial expectations. 
See, e.g., J. Paul Jackson et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of 
Partnerships and Partners—American Law Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REV. 109, 128 (1954) 
[hereinafter Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project]: 
It is felt that the average partner in a small partnership would reasonably expect any 
potential gains or losses with respect to contributed property to accrue to the partnership 
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wrong, or the sharing of precontribution items raised a commercial issue 
among the partners, the partners could address such concerns through the 
partnership agreement, thereby correcting distortions or compensating 
disadvantaged partners. Consistent with the emerging hallmark of 
Subchapter K, the general rules governing partnership allocations were 
sufficiently flexible to permit such adjustments.51  
2. The Elective Rule: Ceiling Limited Allocations  
The initial Section 704(c) allocation regime was also flexible 
enough to provide relief for partnerships seeking greater conformity with 
the Substance Principle, even at the cost of additional complexity. 
Congress adopted an alternative, elective allocation rule, set forth in 
Section 704(c)(2) of the 1954 Code, that recognized the unique nature of 
precontribution gains and losses. If a partnership elected to make 
contributed property allocations under Section 704(c)(2), it would make 
such allocations in a manner that took into account the difference 
between the contributed property’s fair market value and basis at 
contribution.52 To the extent permissible, the partnership would allocate 
precontribution gains and losses to the contributing partner, thereby 
  
as a whole and to the partners at the time that the contributed property is sold or 
depreciated, to be so reflected in each partner’s distributive share at the end of the 
partnership’s taxable year.  
Id.  
 51 The American Law Institute also published its recommendations with respect to 
partnership allocations in 1954. Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50. Like Congress, the 
A.L.I. believed that the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed property should 
minimize complexity, maximize certainty in planning, and operate in a manner consistent with 
commercial expectations. Accordingly, it proposed the transference of basis approach for allocations 
attributable to contributed property. Under this approach, a partner recognized no gain or loss at 
contribution, and the partnership’s basis in the contributed property equaled such property’s basis 
immediately prior to contribution. Each partner’s outside basis in her partnership interest equaled a 
proportionate share of the partnership’s aggregate inside basis in all of its property. Indeed, the 
transference of basis approach made no independent effort to equate each partner’s outside basis 
with the basis of the property she contributed to the partnership. As a consequence, each partner had 
an initial book/tax disparity, reflecting the disconnect between such partner’s economic investment 
in the partnership and her deemed tax investment, as reflected in her outside basis. Following 
contribution, the transference of basis approach required the partnership to make all allocations 
attributable to contributed property according to the general allocation rules set forth in the 
partnership agreement. Accordingly, and in stark contrast to the other allocation methodologies 
discussed in this Article, the transference of basis approach resulted in a permanent shift of 
precontribution gains and losses among the partners. The A.L.I. considered a permanent shift 
preferable to a temporary shift because the certainty of a permanent shift would better allow partners 
to quantify the tax consequences of a contribution and correct any resulting distortions in their 
economic arrangements. However, cognizant that permanent shifting may not be desirable to all 
partnerships, the A.L.I. supported the elective use of alternative allocation methodologies. Id. at 127-
30. Accordingly, the A.L.I. recommended that Congress allow partnerships to elect to allocate items 
attributable to contributed property under either (1) the entity approach ultimately adopted by 
Congress in 1954 and set forth in Section 704(c)(1) or (2) the partial deferred sales method, 
described infra note 82. Id.  
 52 I.R.C. § 704(c)(2) (1954). A partnership could elect to apply Section 704(c)(2) on a 
property-by-property basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) (1956).  
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reducing the potential for book/tax disparities and income and loss 
shifting.   
For instance, if the partnership in Example 1 sells Blackacre for 
$200, the partnership would allocate the entire $100 recognized tax loss 
to B, the contributing partner, under Section 704(c)(2). B previously 
recognized Blackacre’s $100 precontribution economic loss, as reflected 
in her capital account and, therefore, she would be the proper recipient of 
the corresponding tax loss. Consistent with the Substance Principle, this 
allocation would eliminate B’s book/tax disparity, avoid the creation of 
additional book/tax disparities, and prevent the shifting of any 
precontribution loss from B to A.53     
Based on this example, the elective Section 704(c)(2) allocation 
rule appears to codify the Substance Principle, thereby solving the 
problem of contributed property. Such a conclusion, however, would be 
premature. The foregoing example assumed that the fair market value of 
the contributed property remained unchanged while held by the 
partnership. But how would Section 704(c)(2) operate if that assumption 
were relaxed? Specifically, how would a partnership allocate 
precontribution gains and losses when such gains and losses were offset 
by postcontribution changes in value?54  
To illustrate, return to Example 1. Suppose that Blackacre 
appreciated after contribution, and the partnership ultimately sells the 
property for $250. For book purposes, the partnership would recognize a 
$50 gain ($250 amount realized minus $200 book value), which it would 
allocate equally between A and B. Each partner’s capital account would 
be increased accordingly from $200 to $225. For tax purposes, 
Blackacre’s disposition would generate a $50 loss ($250 amount realized 
minus $300 inside basis), which the partnership must allocate between A 
and B. But how should this $50 tax loss be allocated between A and B?    
The answer depends on Congress’s characterization of the $50 
loss recognized on Blackacre’s sale. Congress could have characterized 
this loss in one of two ways—as a net loss, comprised of both 
precontribution and postcontribution changes in the property’s value, or 
as a gross loss recognized by the partnership at the time of sale. Each 
characterization would have resulted in a different allocation rule: one 
would have been consistent with the Substance Principle and one would 
have violated the Substance Principle.      
If the $50 loss were considered a net loss, it would be composed 
of two items—a $100 precontribution loss and a $50 postcontribution 
  
 53 For a more thorough discussion of the consequences of Blackacre’s sale under an 
allocation rule consistent with the Substance Principle, see supra Part I.A. 
 54 Put another way, how would the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed 
property operate in either of the following circumstances: (1) a partner contributes built in loss 
property to a partnership, the property appreciates following contribution, and the partnership later 
sells such property or (2) a partner contributes built in gain property to a partnership, the property 
depreciates following contribution, and the partnership later sells such property? 
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gain. These components would be separately allocated to A and B in a 
manner sensitive to each partner’s ownership interest in Blackacre over 
time. Accordingly, the partnership would allocate the $100 
precontribution tax loss entirely to B, thereby matching the treatment of 
the corresponding $100 precontribution economic loss. By contrast, the 
$50 postcontribution tax gain would be allocated equally between A and 
B just like the corresponding $50 book gain. Following the sale, neither 
partner would have a book/tax disparity, and no portion of Blackacre’s 
precontribution loss would have shifted from B to A.55 Indeed, this 
bifurcated allocation approach would comply with the Substance 
Principle and provide a perfect solution to the problem of contributed 
property.56 
Congress, however, characterized the $50 tax loss as a gross 
loss, not a net loss. The partnership would recognize a $50 loss on 
Blackacre’s sale ($250 amount realized minus $300 inside basis) and, 
therefore, the partnership would have a $50 loss—and nothing more—to 
allocate to A and B. Indeed, under Section 704(c)(2), the partnership 
itself would act as an internal constraint—essentially, a ceiling—on the 
amount that could be allocated to A and B. Put another way, in allocating 
the $50 loss, the partnership was only permitted to account for events 
occurring inside the partnership, particularly Blackacre’s sale. The 
partnership was not permitted to consider circumstances outside the 
partnership that might otherwise affect the allocation of the $50 loss, 
such as Blackacre’s ownership over time. Accordingly, Section 704(c)(2) 
provided that the total gain or loss allocated to the partners was “limited 
to a ‘ceiling’ which [could not] exceed the amount of gain or loss 
realized by the partnership.”57 This rule is referred to as the ceiling rule.58     
In Example 1, the partnership would recognize a $50 loss on 
Blackacre’s sale and, therefore, the ceiling rule would limit the 
partnership’s permissible allocation to such $50 tax loss. Recall that the 
partnership would allocate a $25 book gain to both A and B after selling 
  
 55 As discussed, the partnership would recognize a $50 book gain on Blackacre’s sale, 
and the partnership would allocate each partner $25 of such book gain. Hence, A’s and B’s capital 
accounts each would increase from $200 to $225. For tax purposes, the partnership would allocate a 
$25 tax gain to A, thereby increasing her outside basis in her partnership interest from $200 to $225. 
By contrast, the partnership would allocate a $75 net tax loss to B ($100 precontribution loss plus 
$25 postcontribution gain), which would reduce her outside basis from $300 to $225. Accordingly, 
following Blackacre’s sale, each partner’s outside basis would equal her capital account balance.  
 56 Also, this bifurcated allocation approach would be consistent with the aggregate 
theory of partnerships. Under this theory, A would be treated as if she purchased an undivided 
interest in Blackacre in exchange for $100, one-half of her investment in the partnership. If A sold 
such undivided interest for $125, A would recognize a $25 gain. 
 57 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) (1956). Section 704(c)(2) of the 1954 Code did not 
explicitly provide for the ceiling rule, but the legislative history of Section 704(c) assumed its 
application. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622 at 93 (1954) (providing an example in which the ceiling rule 
limits the amount of depreciation allocated to a noncontributing partner).  
 58 The ceiling rule infused entity principles into an allocation regime that otherwise was 
consistent with the aggregate theory of partnerships. As a result, Section 704(c)(2) of the 1954 Code 
was a hybrid rule, reflecting both aggregate and entity theories of partnerships.  
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Blackacre for $250. Under the Substance Principle, the partnership 
would allocate a $25 tax gain to A to match her book allocation. 
However, the ceiling rule would prevent this result and require the 
partnership to allocate only the $50 loss actually recognized. As a result 
of the ceiling rule’s application, A necessarily would have a book/tax 
disparity following Blackacre’s sale, and a portion of Blackacre’s built in 
loss would shift from B to A.59 In an effort to minimize these adverse 
consequences, the partnership would allocate the entire $50 tax loss to B 
and none to A.60  
Table 2: Allocations Under the Ceiling Rule 
 A B 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 300 
Sale of 
Blackacre 
25 0 25 (50) 
Ending 
Balance 
225 200 225 250 
 
When compared to Section 704(c)(1), which disregarded the 
unique nature of contributed property allocations, Section 704(c)(2) 
provided partners with a more equitable result. Yet distortions persisted 
under Section 704(c)(2) because of the ceiling rule. Although the 
magnitude of such distortions was smaller, the violation of the Substance 
Principle was no less problematic.61  
In Example 1, for instance, both A and B would have $25 
book/tax disparities following Blackacre’s sale, and such book/tax 
disparities would not be eliminated until the partners terminate their 
relationships with the partnership. Further, the ceiling rule’s application 
would shift $25 of B’s precontribution tax loss from B to A. A would 
  
 59 Before the partnership sold Blackacre, A’s capital account and outside basis were 
$200. As a result of the sale, the partnership would allocate a $25 book gain to A, thereby increasing 
her capital account from $200 to $225. For tax purposes, the partnership would recognize a $50 loss, 
which it then would allocate between A and B. If none of the loss were allocated to A, she would 
have a $25 book/tax disparity ($225 capital account versus $200 outside basis), and $25 of 
Blackacre’s precontribution loss would shift to her. By contrast, to the extent the partnership would 
allocate any of the $50 loss to A, her outside basis would decrease below its initial $200 balance. As 
A’s outside basis would fall, her book/tax disparity would increase and more of Blackacre’s 
precontribution loss would shift.  
 60 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) ex.2 (1956).   
 61 See J. Paul Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1207 (1954) [hereinafter Jackson et al., 1954 Internal Revenue Code] 
(“[A]lthough the ceiling rule modification . . . provides for allocation of gains, losses and 
depreciation allowances with respect to contributed property more in accordance with economic 
reality than . . . the entity approach [of Section 704(c)(1)], in some instances it still results in an 
offsetting gain or loss on the disposition of the partnership interest.”). 
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receive the benefit of a $25 economic gain, as reflected in her capital 
account, but she would not bear the tax burden of the corresponding $25 
tax gain. Indeed, A’s $25 tax gain would be sheltered by $25 of 
Blackacre’s precontribution loss, which the ceiling rule would shift to 
her. Like Section 704(c)(1), the right partner would not pay tax on the 
right amount at the right time under the ceiling limited rule of Section 
704(c)(2).62     
3. The Problem Intensifies: Contributions of Depreciable 
Property  
The ceiling rule also caused significant distortions in the 
depreciation of contributed property. To illustrate these problems, 
consider Example 2. X contributed $200 cash to the partnership and Y 
contributed a depreciable building (“Building”) to the partnership. Y 
purchased the Building six years earlier for $150. At contribution, the 
Building had a fair market value of $200 and a basis, adjusted to reflect 
prior depreciation deductions, of $60.  
Following contribution, the Building had a book value of $200 
and an inside basis of $60 to the partnership. X’s and Y’s initial capital 
accounts were $200. Consistent with her capital account, X’s outside 
basis in her partnership interest was $200. By contrast, Y’s outside basis 
was $60. Thus, Y had an immediate book/tax disparity resulting from the 
Building’s $140 precontribution gain.63 Indeed, Y received the economic 
benefit of the Building’s precontribution increase in value, as reflected in 
her capital account, but the corresponding tax gain was deferred. 
As noted, the Building is depreciable property. Prior to 
contribution, Y depreciated the Building on straight-line basis using a 
ten-year recovery period.64 Thus, Y took annual depreciation deductions 
of $15 with respect to the Building ($150 initial basis divided by ten-year 
recovery period) in each of the previous six years. After Y’s 
contribution, the partnership will continue to depreciate the Building. But 
  
 62 In addition to the ceiling rule, Congress provided a third alternative allocation rule for 
partners contributing certain undivided interests in property to a partnership. I.R.C. § 704(c)(3) 
(1954). Under this rule, the partnership would allocate items attributable to these undivided interests 
as if the undivided interests had never been contributed to the partnership. Id. The scope of this rule, 
however, was quite limited. It only applied if all of the partners held undivided interests in the 
contributed property, and each partner’s interests in such property corresponded to her interest in the 
partnership. For a more detailed discussion of former Section 704(c)(3), see Jackson et al., 1954 
Internal Revenue Code, supra note 61, at 1208-10.  
 63 At contribution, the Building has a $140 precontribution gain, which reflects two 
different factors. The first is an increase in the Building’s fair market value. Y purchased the 
property for $150, and its fair market value is $200 at contribution. The second is excess 
depreciation. More specifically, Y has taken $90 of depreciation deductions with respect to the 
Building, thereby reducing its basis from $150 to $60.  
 64 To simplify Example 2, the depreciation conventions set forth in Section 168(d) have 
been disregarded and the recovery periods set forth in Section 168(c) have been modified. See I.R.C. 
§ 168(c)-(d).  
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how it does so, and how it allocates the resulting depreciation deductions 
between X and Y, presents familiar challenges.  
Consistent with the nonrecognition treatment of partnership 
contributions, the partnership would step into the shoes of the 
contributing partner.65 That is, the partnership would depreciate the 
property as if it were the contributing partner, using the same 
methodology and recovery period. In Example 2, the partnership would 
depreciate the Building on a straight-line basis over the four years 
remaining in the property’s ten-year recovery period, thereby taking an 
annual depreciation deduction of $15.  
For capital account purposes, the partnership would recover the 
contributed property’s book value using the same methodology and 
remaining recovery period applicable for tax purposes.66 In Example 2, 
the partnership would recover the Building’s $200 book value on a 
straight-line basis over the four years remaining in the property’s 
recovery period. Thus, the Building would generate $50 of book 
depreciation annually, and the partnership would allocate such book 
depreciation equally between X and Y.  
Again, the ceiling rule would interfere with the partnership’s 
depreciation allocations. The partnership would allocate $25 of book 
depreciation to each partner, but the partnership only has $15 of tax 
depreciation. The ceiling rule would apply to the partnership’s allocation, 
thereby preventing the partnership from making a parallel $25 tax 
allocation to X and Y. Indeed, the partnership would not be permitted to 
allocate anything more than the $15 of tax depreciation. Thus, the 
partnership would allocate the entire $15 of tax depreciation to X in 
order to minimize the adverse effects of the ceiling rule.67 By contrast, 
the partnership would allocate no tax depreciation to Y.   
Table 3: Depreciation Allocations Under the Ceiling Rule 
 X Y 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 60 
Depreciation (25) (15) (25) 0 
Ending 
Balance 
175 185 175 60 
 
  
 65 I.R.C. § 168(i)(7)(2006).  
 66 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3) (as amended in 2008). Specifically, the 
partnership’s book depreciation must equal “an amount that bears the same relationship to the 
[contributed property’s] book value” as the corresponding tax depreciation “bears to the adjusted 
basis of the property.” Id.  
 67 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2)(i) ex. 1 (1956).  
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The partnership’s ceiling limited allocation of the $15 tax 
depreciation would violate the Substance Principle. After accounting for 
the Building’s depreciation deduction, X would have a $10 book/tax 
disparity ($175 capital account versus $185 outside basis), reflecting the 
partnership’s failure to allocate her sufficient tax depreciation. Further, 
application of the ceiling rule would shift $10 of the Building’s 
precontribution gain from Y to X. By allocating $10 less tax depreciation 
than book depreciation to X, the partnership would deny her a tax 
deduction for a $10 economic loss she suffered during the year.68 In 
doing so, X, rather than Y, would bear the burden of $10 of the 
Building’s precontribution tax gain. Put another way, Y would receive 
the economic benefit of such $10 precontribution gain at contribution, as 
reflected in her initial $200 capital account. Yet Y would avoid the 
corresponding $10 tax burden because of the ceiling rule’s application.69   
This pattern would continue for the remainder of the Building’s 
recovery period. Each year, the ceiling rule would limit the partnership’s 
allocations. Accordingly, X’s book/tax disparity would increase 
annually, and portions of the Building’s precontribution tax gain would 
shift from Y to X. By the end of the Building’s recovery period, X and Y 
would have book/tax disparities of $40, and $40 of precontribution gain 
would have shifted from Y to X.70 Indeed, Y would have avoided the tax 
liability for $40 of the Building’s precontribution gain, even though she 
received the corresponding economic benefit for such amount at 
contribution. Yet again, the right partner would not have paid tax on the 
right amount at the right time.  
  
 68 Consider the depreciation of the Building under the aggregate theory of partnerships. 
In exchange for $100 of her contribution, A would receive an undivided interest in the Building, 
worth $100. The Building had fours years remaining in its recovery period and, therefore, A would 
be entitled to a $25 depreciation deduction ($100 basis divided by 4 years).  
 69 Like the ceiling rule distortions previously discussed supra Part I.B.2, these distortions 
were temporary. They would reverse themselves following a liquidation of the partnership, the 
disposition of the affected partner’s partnership interest and, in many instances, a disposition of the 
contributed property. However, also like the distortions previously discussed, these distortions were 
highly problematic despite their temporary nature. 
 70 At the end of the Building’s remaining four-year recovery period, the partnership 
would have allocated book depreciation of $100—$25 annually for four years—to X, and her capital 
account would have decreased from $200 to $100. By contrast, the partnership would have allocated 
$60 of tax depreciation—$15 annually for four years—to X and her outside basis would have 
decreased from $200 to $140. Thus, X would have a book/tax disparity of $40 when the Building 
was fully depreciated. Y too would have a $40 book/tax disparity. During the Building’s remaining 
recovery period, the partnership would have allocated $100 of book depreciation to Y, thereby 
reducing her capital account from $200 to $100. For tax purposes, Y would have been allocated no 
depreciation and her outside basis would have remained unchanged at $60. As a result of the ceiling 
rule’s application, $40 of the Building’s precontribution gain would have shifted from Y to X. 
Simply put, X would have borne the tax burden of $40 of Y’s precontribution gain in the Building, 
for which Y previously received credit in her capital account.  
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4. The Cost of Violating the Substance Principle—Part 1  
The initial Section 704(c) allocation regime reflected Congress’s 
tempered view of deviations from the Substance Principle. Congress 
understood that both the general rule of Section 704(c)(1) and the ceiling 
limited approach of Section 704(c)(2) might shift precontribution gains 
and losses among partners. Yet Congress expected that such shifts would 
be relatively minor and of small public cost. One witness at a 
congressional hearing addressing the enactment of Subchapter K testified 
that “[t]he problems in the partnership field usually involve the question 
of which partner is to be taxed and when. The Government is frequently 
nothing but an arbitrator and stakeholder in an intrapartnership 
controversy.”71 It was this estimation, more than anything else, that 
supported Congress’s decision to make flexibility, rather than the 
Substance Principle, the hallmark of the rules governing allocations 
attributable to contributed property.72 
C. The 1984 American Law Institute 
1. The Cost of Violating the Substance Principle—Part 2  
Thirty years’ experience with allocations attributable to 
contributed property proved that Congress had miscalculated the cost of 
disregarding the Substance Principle. Contrary to the views expressed in 
1954, income and loss shifting, like any deferral technique, did 
compromise the government’s interests. The government was much more 
than an impartial referee with respect to allocations attributable to 
contributed property; it had a vested stake in such allocations.  
As discussed supra, distortions created by breaches of the 
Substance Principle are temporary, ultimately correcting themselves.73 If 
the partnership liquidates or the affected partner disposes of her 
partnership interest, such event will eliminate existing book/tax 
  
 71 Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code—Topic 
29—Partnerships: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong. 1368, 1370 (1953) 
(Statement of Mark H. Johnson, American Bar Association); see also Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. 
Project, supra note 50, at 125. 
 72 See, e.g., Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50, at 112:  
Most of the problems encountered in the partnership area are concerned with the 
distribution of the burden of taxation among the members of the group. Since the 
Treasury from the standpoint of tax policy is not greatly concerned about this allocation, 
the issues are essentially not between Treasury and taxpayer-partner but between partner 
and partner. Consequently, tax technicians should be able to agree on the formulation of 
rules to govern the complex partnership relationship, and this formulation should not 
raise issues that pass beyond technical tax policy.  
Id.; see also Jackson et al., 1954 Internal Revenue Code, supra note 61, at 1210 (“In view of the 
three different rules governing contributed property, the 1954 Code allows the partners considerable 
leeway in determining the allocation gain, loss and allowances with respect to such property.”).  
 73 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
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disparities and reverse income and loss shifts. Accordingly, from an 
intra-partnership perspective, no one is harmed by temporary income or 
loss shifts. 
But income and loss shifting is not without cost. On the contrary, 
income and loss shifting imposes a tremendous cost on the government. 
When partners are subject to different tax rates, the Section 704(c) 
allocation rules allow the shifting of income to partners with lower tax 
rates, and the shifting of losses and deductions to partners with higher tax 
rates.74 As a result, the government suffers a current revenue loss. 
Although such income and loss shifts may reverse themselves one day 
and the government ultimately may collect the avoided tax revenue, the 
government nonetheless suffers a permanent revenue loss because of the 
time value of money.75 Indeed, the longer the deferral, the larger the 
public cost.  
2. The Proposal: The Deferred Sales Method  
The American Law Institute (“A.L.I.”) initiated a comprehensive 
review of the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed 
property in 1984.76 Recognizing Section 704(c)’s potential for abuse, the 
A.L.I. considered alternative allocation rules that better effectuated the 
Substance Principle. The most promising approach was the deferred sales 
method.77   
  
 74 In Example 1, for instance, imagine that A had a tax rate of thirty-five percent, 
whereas B was not subject to tax. If B could shift $50 of Blackacre’s precontribution loss, then A 
could shelter $50 of income otherwise subject to tax at a thirty-five percent rate. This loss shift 
would save A $17.50 ($50 sheltered income * 35% tax rate) without affecting B’s tax liability. 
Accordingly, neither A nor B would be injured by the loss shift. The government, however, would 
suffer a current revenue loss of $17.50 if the partnership used Section 704(c) to shift Blackacre’s 
precontribution loss.  
 75 If, as in supra note 74, the partnership liquidates following Blackacre’s sale, A would 
recognize a $50 gain, and such gain would offset the previously allocated $50 loss attributable to the 
property’s sale. Assuming constant tax rates, A would incur a tax liability of $17.50 at liquidation. 
Because of the time value of money, however, A’s future tax liability would not fully offset the 
revenue loss incurred in the year of Blackacre’s sale. Accordingly, the deferral would represent a 
permanent loss to the government and permanent benefit to A. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1974).  
 76 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K, 
PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 127-40 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT].  
 77 The deferred sales method initially appeared in General Counsel Memorandum 
10,092, issued by Treasury in 1932. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 10,092, XI-1 C.B. 114 (1932), 
revoked by I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 26,379, 1950-1 C.B. 58 (1950). Thereafter, Congress, Treasury 
and commentators have considered various formulations of the deferred sales method. The form of 
the deferred sales method set forth in the 1932 Treasury memorandum is referred to as the partial 
deferred sales method and is described in greater detail infra note 82. The A.L.I. in 1954 also 
considered the application of the partial deferred sales method. See Jackson et Al., 1954 A.L.I. 
Project, supra note 50, at 120-23; see also COMM. ON P’SHIPS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX 
SECTION, COMMENTS RELATING TO PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED PURSUANT TO 
SECTIONS 704(c), 707(a)(2) AND 752 (1985), reprinted in 85 TAX NOTES TODAY 102-57 (May 22, 
1985) [hereinafter 1985 NYSBA COMMENTS] (recommending that Treasury include the partial 
deferred sales method in regulations to be issued under Section 704(c)). Future formulations of the 
deferred sales method, including the A.L.I.’s 1984 proposal, generally followed an alternative 
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As discussed supra, the core problem with contributed property 
is the treatment of the contribution transaction, which differs for book 
and tax purposes.78 To some extent, all allocation methods aimed to 
ameliorate this problem, but only the deferred sales method addressed 
the source of the problem—the contribution itself. The deferred sales 
method treated the contribution transaction as a taxable exchange 
between the contributing partner and the partnership. Although the 
contributing partner recognized no gain or loss at contribution, such 
precontribution gain or loss was deferred for future recognition on the 
occurrence of certain triggering events. This deferred precontribution 
gain or loss is referred to as the “deferred sales amount.”  
As in any taxable transaction, the partnership’s inside basis in 
the contributed property was its fair market value at the time of 
contribution. Similarly, the contributed property’s book value and the 
contributing partner’s initial capital account each equaled the property’s 
fair market value at contribution. Under the deferred sales method, 
however, the contributing partner took an outside basis in her partnership 
interest equal to the contributed property’s basis at contribution. The 
contributing partner also had the deferred sales amount, which reflected 
the contributed property’s precontribution gain or loss.79  
Certain future events triggered the contributing partner’s 
recognition of the deferred sales amount. If the partnership disposed of 
the contributed property or the contributing partner disposed of her 
partnership interest, the contributing partner would recognize the 
deferred sales amount. Similarly, distributions would trigger recognition 
of the deferred sales amount. 
The practical effect of the deferred sales method was to 
quarantine any precontribution gains or losses with the contributing 
partner. And this result was extraordinary. Under the deferred sales 
method, the contributing partner, and only the contributing partner, 
recognized the built in gains or losses attributable to contributed 
property. Accordingly, allocations attributable to contributed property no 
longer resulted in book/tax disparities or the shifting of income and 
losses. Simply put, the deferred sales method aligned Section 704(c) and 
the Substance Principle and solved the problem of contributed property.80      
  
approach referred to as the full deferred sales method. See 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 
129-31; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992) (proposing the 
full deferred sales method as one of three contributed property allocation rules). Unless otherwise 
specified, any references to the deferred sales method are references to the full deferred sales 
method.  
 78 See supra Part I.A. 
 79 After contribution, the contributing partner’s outside basis plus her deferred sales 
amount equaled the contributed property’s fair market value at contribution. That is, the contributing 
partner’s outside basis and her deferred sales amount, taken together, equaled the basis that the 
contributing partner would have had in her partnership interest if such partnership interest had been 
acquired in a fully taxable transaction.  
 80 Like the ceiling limited approach of Section 704(c)(2), the deferred sales method 
represented a hybrid of the entity and aggregate theories of partnerships. The contribution 
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To illustrate, consider the deferred sales method’s application to 
Example 1. Under the deferred sales method, B’s contribution of 
Blackacre would be treated as a taxable exchange in which B received a 
partnership interest valued at $200 and the partnership received 
Blackacre, also valued at $200. The partnership would take an inside 
basis of $200 in Blackacre, reflecting the property’s fair market value at 
contribution. B would recognize a $100 loss on the contribution 
exchange ($200 amount realized minus $300 precontribution basis), but 
such loss would be deferred for future recognition. Thus, B would have a 
deferred sales amount of $100. B’s outside basis in her partnership 
interest would be $300 and her initial capital account would be $200.81     
If the partnership later sells Blackacre for $250, the partnership 
would recognize a book gain and a tax gain of $50 ($250 amount 
realized minus $200 book value/inside basis). The partnership would 
allocate these gains equally between A and B, $25 to each partner. 
Additionally, Blackacre’s sale would trigger B’s deferred sales amount, 
and she would recognize the $100 precontribution tax loss deferred at 
contribution. The recognition of the deferred sales amount would not 
require an adjustment to B’s capital account because the corresponding 
$100 precontribution economic loss was previously reflected in B’s 
capital account.     
Table 4: Allocations Using the Deferred Sales Method 
 A B 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 300 
Sale of 
Blackacre 
25 25 25 25 
Def. Sales 
Amt. 
   (100) 
Ending 
Balance 
225 225 225 225 
 
After Blackacre’s sale, the advantages of the deferred sales 
method would become apparent. The partnership would make parallel 
  
transaction was treated as a sale between the contributing partner and the partnership, thereby 
following the entity theory. By contrast, subsequent allocations attributable to the contributed 
property followed the aggregate theory. The contributing partner recognized any precontribution 
gain or loss, although not at the time contribution. The partners shared any precontribution gains or 
losses pursuant to the partnership agreement. Accordingly, allocations attributable to contributed 
property were made in a manner sensitive to the ownership of such contributed property over time.  
 81 A’s consequences would remain unchanged under the deferred sales method. 
Following contribution, she would have a $200 capital account and a $200 outside basis.  
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allocations to A for book and tax purposes and, therefore, Blackacre’s 
sale would not create a book/tax disparity in A’s accounts ($225 capital 
account versus $225 outside basis). In addition, the deferred sales 
method would eliminate B’s book/tax disparity. For book purposes, the 
partnership would allocate a $25 economic gain to B, thereby increasing 
her capital account from $200 to $225. For tax purposes, however, B 
would recognize a net tax loss of $75, comprised of the $25 allocated 
postcontribution gain and the $100 deferred sales amount. B’s outside 
basis in her partnership interest would decrease from $300 to $225, 
thereby aligning her outside basis and her capital account.  
The deferred sales method also would prevent the shifting of 
Blackacre’s $100 precontribution loss from B to A. By quarantining 
Blackacre’s $100 precontribution loss in her deferred sales amount, the 
deferred sales method would ensure that only B would recognize such 
amount. The right partner would pay tax on the right amount at the right 
time.82   
  
 82 The A.L.I. in 1954 considered an alternative formulation of the deferred sales method 
referred to as the partial deferred sales method. See Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 
50, at 120-23; see also Jackson et al., 1954 Internal Revenue Code, supra note 61, at 1206-07. 
Although the partial deferred sales method and the full deferred sales method have many similarities, 
the partial deferred sales method treats the contribution transaction in a fundamentally different 
manner. Specifically, the partial deferred sales method treats the contribution transaction as a taxable 
exchange of partial undivided interests in property between the partners. Accordingly, the 
contribution is split into two transactions: a taxable exchange of property and a nonrecognition 
transaction. To illustrate, consider the partial deferred sales method’s application to Example 1. 
Recall that A contributed $200 cash and B contributed Blackacre, with a fair market value of $200 
and a basis of $300, to the equal partnership. Under the partial deferred sales method, B would 
exchange a fifty percent interest in Blackacre—worth $100 with a basis of $150—for $100 of A’s 
cash contribution. B would recognize a $50 loss, but such loss would be deferred in her deferred 
sales amount. B’s outside basis in this portion of her contribution would be $150 and the 
partnership’s inside basis in such portion would be $100, reflecting exchange characterization. 
Second, B would contribute the remaining portion of Blackacre to the partnership in a 
nonrecognition transaction. Consistent with nonrecognition treatment, B’s outside basis and the 
partnership’s inside basis in this portion of the contribution would be $150. Taken together, B’s 
outside basis in her partnership interest would be $300, her deferred sales amount would be $50, and 
the partnership’s inside basis in Blackacre would be $250. After contribution, the partial deferred 
sales method would operate just like the full deferred sales method. That is, the same future events 
would trigger recognition of the deferred sales amount. For a more detailed discussion of the partial 
deferred sales method, see generally Gregory J. Marich & William S. McKee, Sections 704(c) and 
743(b): The Shortcomings of Existing Regulations and the Problems of Publicly Traded 
Partnerships, 41 TAX L. REV. 627, 682-84 (1986); 1985 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 77. 
  The partial deferred sales method’s treatment of the contribution transaction is more 
consistent with the aggregate view of partnerships than the full deferred sales method and, therefore, 
many commentators view the partial deferred sales method as the theoretically correct method of 
allocating items attributable to contributed property. However, the partial deferred sales method’s 
conceptual purity also leads to heightened complexity when compared to the full deferred sales 
method. More importantly, as will be discussed infra note 192, the full deferred sales method, which 
reflects both the aggregate and entity theories of partnerships, is more consistent with Subchapter K 
as it exists in practice. See, e.g., Laura E. Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying 
Subchapter K: The Deferred Sale Method, 51 SMU L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1997) (concluding that both 
formulations of the deferred sales method tax the same amount of gain, but the full deferred sales 
method is simpler); John P. Steines Jr., Partnership Allocations of Built in Gain or Loss, 45 TAX L. 
REV. 615, 641 (1990); 1985 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 77. 
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3. The Proposal Continued: Contributions of Depreciable 
Property  
The deferred sales method also solved problems concerning the 
depreciation of contributed property. Consistent with its treatment of the 
contribution as a taxable exchange, the deferred sales method required 
the partnership to treat contributed property as newly purchased property. 
Thus, the partnership recovered its inside basis in such property using the 
appropriate methodology and a new recovery period.  
Additionally, the deferred sales method required the contributing 
partner to recognize a portion of her deferred sales amount in each year 
of the contributed property’s new recovery period. Thus, the contributing 
partner recognized the deferred sales amount incrementally throughout 
the contributed property’s depreciable life. The portion of the deferred 
sales amount recognized annually was proportionate to the partnership’s 
depreciation deduction for the taxable year. Specifically, the percentage 
of the deferred sales amount recognized equaled the percentage of the 
partnership’s initial inside basis in the contributed property recovered 
during such year.  
To illustrate, consider the deferred sales method’s application to 
Example 2. Recall that the Building’s fair market value was $200 and its 
adjusted basis was $60 at contribution. Under the deferred sales method, 
Y would recognize a $140 gain on the contribution exchange, but this 
gain would be deferred through her deferred sales amount. Y’s outside 
basis in her partnership interest would be $60, and her capital account 
would be $200. The partnership’s inside basis in the Building would be 
$200, reflecting its fair market value at contribution.83    
For tax purposes, the partnership would treat the Building as 
newly placed in service property, and depreciate it using the straight-line 
method over a fresh ten-year recovery period. Accordingly, the 
partnership would take annual depreciation deductions of $20 ($200 
inside basis divided by ten-year recovery period). For book purposes, the 
partnership would use the same methodology and recovery period, 
resulting in annual book depreciation deductions of $20 ($200 book 
value divided by ten-year recovery period). The partnership would 
allocate these book and tax deductions equally between X and Y, $10 to 
each partner. Additionally, Y would amortize her deferred sales amount 
over the Building’s ten-year recovery period, thereby recognizing $14 
($140 deferred sales amount divided by ten-year recovery period) of the 
Building’s precontribution gain annually.  
In the first year following contribution, the partnership would 
allocate $10 of book depreciation to X and Y, thereby reducing each 
partner’s capital account from $200 to $190. The partnership similarly 
  
 83 Again, the consequences of the contribution to X would remain unchanged under the 
deferred sales method. A would have a capital account of $200 and an outside basis of $200.  
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would allocate $10 of tax depreciation to each partner. X’s outside basis 
in her partnership interest would decrease from $200 to $190, just like 
her capital account. Y, however, also would recognize $14 of her 
deferred sales amount and, therefore, she would recognize a net $4 gain 
($14 deferred sales amount minus $10 depreciation deduction). 
Accordingly, Y’s outside basis would increase from $60 to $64. 
Table 5: Depreciation Allocations Using the Deferred Sales Method 
 X Y 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 60 
Depreciation (10) (10) (10) (10) 
Def. Sales 
Amt. 
   14 
Ending 
Balance 
190 190 190 64 
 
Again, the benefits of the deferred sales method would be 
evident. Because X would receive parallel allocations for book and tax 
purposes, she would not develop a book/tax disparity. Although Y would 
continue to have a book/tax disparity, such disparity would decrease. 
And most importantly, none of the Building’s precontribution gain would 
shift to X.       
This pattern would repeat itself annually throughout the 
Building’s depreciable life. At the conclusion of the ten-year recovery 
period, neither X nor Y would have a book/tax disparity, and none of the 
Building’s $140 precontribution gain would have shifted from Y to X.84 
Y would have received economic credit for the Building’s $140 built in 
gain at contribution, as reflected in her capital account. Similarly, at the 
end of the Building’s recovery period, Y would have borne the 
corresponding tax burden of the Building’s $140 precontribution gain.  
  
 84 At the end of the ten-year recovery period, the partnership would have allocated book 
depreciation of $100 and tax depreciation of $100 to both X and Y ($10 annual book/tax 
depreciation multiplied by ten years). For capital account purposes, X’s and Y’s capital accounts 
would have decreased from $200 to $100. Similarly, X’s outside basis would have decreased from 
$200 to $100. In addition, Y would have recognized her entire $140 deferred sales amount, thereby 
resulting in a net $40 gain over the Building’s ten-year recovery period ($140 deferred sales amount 
minus $100 tax depreciation). Accordingly, her outside basis would have increased from $60 to 
$100.  
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4. The A.L.I.’s Recommendation: No to the Deferred Sales 
Method 
Ultimately, the A.L.I. did not recommend the deferred sales 
method’s adoption. The A.L.I.’s primary reservations related to valuation 
and the methodology’s complexity.85 
For the A.L.I., the deferred sales method’s most troublesome 
feature was its dependence on asset valuation.86 Specifically, the deferred 
sales method required a partnership to determine the contributed 
property’s fair market value at contribution in order to compute the 
deferred sales amount and the partnership’s inside basis. The A.L.I. 
feared that such valuation requirement would result in unanticipated tax 
consequences to the partners and would afford partnerships new 
opportunities for strategic behavior.87 
Additionally, the A.L.I. was concerned about the deferred sales 
method’s complexity.88 Unlike the allocation rules set forth in Section 
704(c) of the 1954 Code, the deferred sales method required the 
partnership to make computations in the year of contribution and in each 
year thereafter. As noted, the partnership would have to value all 
property at contribution. The partnership then would have to determine 
annually whether any adjustments to the deferred sales amount are 
necessary, for example to reflect the depreciation of contributed 
property. 
Further questions arose regarding the deferred sales method’s 
proper scope. The A.L.I. believed that the same methodology should 
govern Section 704(c) and allocations following the admission of a 
partner to an existing partnership.89 This conclusion, however, would 
have expanded the deferred sales method’s scope and complexity. 
Partnerships admit new partners regularly, and each admission would 
necessitate the deferred sales method’s application. The A.L.I. believed 
that the administrative burden created by such expansive use of the 
deferred sales method was too great to impose on partnerships.90     
Although acknowledging the ceiling rule’s incompatibility with 
the Substance Principle, the A.L.I.’s rejection of the deferred sales 
method tacitly endorsed the ceiling limited approach of Section 
704(c)(2).91 Indeed, the A.L.I. believed that the ceiling rule possessed an 
important advantage compared to the deferred sales method. The ceiling 
  
 85 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 131-38.  
 86 Id. at 131-36.  
 87 For a more detailed discussion of the valuation objection to the deferred sales method, 
see infra Part III.A. 
 88 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 136-38. 
 89 Id. at 136. Problems virtually identical to the problem of contributed property arise in 
other contexts, including the admission of a new partner to an existing partnership. See discussion 
infra note 98.  
 90 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 137. 
 91 Id. at 139. 
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rule used readily ascertainable numbers computed by reference to the 
contributed property’s basis and ultimate sales price. The A.L.I. felt that 
“this ‘reality’ testing may provide a significant check on manipulating 
allocation arrangements between partners.”92 
Like Congress in 1954, the A.L.I. assumed that partners rarely 
used Section 704(c) or the ceiling rule in an abusive manner.93 But the 
A.L.I.’s discussion of allocations attributable to contributed property 
concluded with a prescient remark: 
If, because of the ease with which gain or loss on contributed property can be 
shifted between partners, such shifting is being broadly used to gain tax 
advantage, a rule to prevent such shifting may be appropriate. If, on the other 
hand, such shifting generally occurs only because of valuation uncertainty or a 
desire by taxpayers to avoid the additional complexity that a § 704(c)(2) 
allocation agreement entails, then the adoption of a rule similar to the deferred-
sale approach described above seems unwise.94  
Thus, the A.L.I. suggested that if partnerships strategically used 
contributed property allocations to shift income or losses, congressional 
reconsideration of the deferred sales method would be proper.      
D. The 1984 Internal Revenue Code 
Congress, too, was ultimately compelled to acknowledge the 
many abusive transactions capitalizing on the tax law’s general failure to 
account for the time value of money.95 The Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984 attempted to curb many of these abuses, including tax-advantaged 
allocations attributable to contributed property.96 In amending Section 
704(c), Congress required that partnerships allocate items attributable to 
contributed property by accounting for the difference between the 
property’s basis and its fair market value at contribution.97 Congress thus 
converted the elective allocation rule previously set forth in Section 
  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at 139-40. 
 94 Id. at 140. 
 95 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 7 (Comm. Print 1984), reprinted 
in 5 TAX REFORM 1984: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984: THE LAW, 
REPORTS, HEARINGS, DEBATES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1985) 
[hereinafter 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION]; H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1095 (1984).  
 96 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 71, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified 
in Prior I.R.C. § 704(c)(1984)).  
 97 I.R.C. § 704(c) (1984). Specifically, Section 704(c) provided that  
[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary, income, gain, loss, and deduction with 
respect to property contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among 
partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis of the property to the 
partnership and its fair market value at the time of contribution. 
Id. 
2009] SAVING SUBCHAPTER K 1411 
704(c)(2) into a mandatory rule governing all allocations attributable to 
contributed property.98 
Section 704(c)’s amendment reflected a newfound congressional 
commitment to the Substance Principle. How closely aligned the Section 
704(c) allocation rules and the Substance Principle would become, 
however, was entirely dependent on the fate of the ceiling rule. And, on 
this point, Congress faltered.  
The 1984 Act’s legislative history appeared to contemplate the 
ceiling rule’s continuing application.99 Nonetheless, Congress granted 
Treasury broad authority to issue regulations governing allocations 
attributable to contributed property.100 Indeed, this legislative grant 
explicitly authorized Treasury to adopt alternative allocation 
methodologies that accelerated the elimination of book/tax disparities, 
including those perpetuated by the ceiling rule.101     
  
 98 Congress omitted certain allocations, such as allocations following the admission of a 
partner to an existing partnership, from this new Section 704(c) allocation regime believing such 
allocations were sufficiently addressed by the Section 704(b) substantial economic effect 
regulations. See 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 95, at 212. These allocations, 
referred to as reverse Section 704(c) allocations, raise issues indistinguishable from those raised by 
allocations attributable to contributed property. The Section 704(b) substantial economic effect 
regulations permit a partnership to rebook its assets to reflect their fair market value following the 
occurrence of certain enumerated events, including the admission of a partner to an existing 
partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (as amended in 2008). If the partnership revalues its 
assets, then the historic partners’ capital accounts are increased or decreased to reflect any book 
gains or losses. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(2), (3). The rebooking is not a taxable event, however, and 
no corresponding adjustments are made to the partnership’s inside basis in its assets or to the historic 
partners’ outside basis in their partnership interests. Like a partnership contribution, the rebooking 
results in an immediate book/tax disparity for the historic partners. Thus, the partnership can no 
longer make parallel book and tax allocations with respect to its historic property. Put another way, 
the rebooking of partnership property creates a problem identical to the problem of contributed 
property. Allocations attributable to rebooked property cannot have substantial economic effect and 
necessarily require an alternative allocation regime. Accordingly, the Section 704(b) substantial 
economic effect regulations command that a partnership apply Section 704(c) principles when 
allocating items attributable to rebooked property. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(4). For a detailed 
discussion of reverse Section 704(c) allocations, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, ¶ 
11.02[2][c][ii]. 
 99 The 1984 Act’s legislative history is virtually silent on the ceiling rule, only 
mentioning it in one footnote. 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 95, at 213, n.4; 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1209, n.3. (1984). Congress granted Treasury the authority to permit 
partnerships to use more accelerated means of eliminating book/tax disparities than those permitted 
under prior law. 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 95, at 213. In a footnote to this 
statement, the legislative history suggests amending an example in the former Section 704(c) 
regulations applying the ceiling rule to depreciable property. Specifically, the legislative history 
suggested that the example could be amended to permit an electing partnership to use any gains 
recognized on the contributed property’s subsequent disposition to offset prior ceiling rule 
distortions. Id. at 213 n.4. The implication, however, was that the new Section 704(c) regime would 
preserve the ceiling rule. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992).  
 100 See 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 95, at 213-14; H.R. REP. NO. 
98-861, at 857 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1209 (1984). 
 101 See 1984 JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 95, at 213. Specifically, the 
Joint Committee on Taxation’s explanation of the 1984 Act provides that “[i]t was anticipated that 
Treasury Regulations may permit partners to agree to a more rapid elimination of disparities between 
the value and adjusted basis of contributed property (determined at the time of contribution) among 
partners than is required by the new rules.” Id. 
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Congress directed partnerships to rely on the prior Section 
704(c) regulations until Treasury issued regulations interpreting the 1984 
amendment to Section 704(c).102 In doing so, Congress subjected all 
Section 704(c) allocations to the ceiling rule. It would be almost a decade 
before Treasury issued the regulations that would shape the future 
relationship between allocations attributable to contributed property and 
the Substance Principle. 
E. The 1992 Treasury Regulations 
In December 1992, Treasury proposed new regulations under 
Section 704(c) (“Section 704(c) Regulations”).103 Consistent with all 
prior efforts to regulate allocations attributable to contributed property, 
Treasury strove to implement the challenging congressional mandate to 
maximize both flexibility and the Substance Principle, while 
simultaneously minimizing complexity and the potential for abuse.104  
The Section 704(c) Regulations give partnerships myriad 
options. They permit partnerships to use any reasonable method of 
allocating items attributable to contributed property so long as such 
method accounts for the difference between the property’s fair market 
value and its basis at contribution.105 The partnership selects a reasonable 
allocation methodology on a property-by-property basis and, therefore, it 
is not limited to one allocation method.106 Rather, a partnership can apply 
multiple allocation methodologies to its various contributed properties.    
The Section 704(c) Regulations list three methods that Treasury 
considers reasonable means of allocating items attributable to contributed 
property.107 The first is the traditional method subject to the ceiling 
  
 102 Id. at 214. 
 103 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992).  
 104 Id. The preamble to the proposed Section 704(c) Regulations states that Congress 
granted Treasury broad regulatory authority in drafting such regulations because of  
Congressional concern that the existing regulations under the formerly elective method 
did not provide sufficient flexibility and were overly burdensome for taxpayers in 
situations where there was little potential for abuse. The proposed regulations attempt to 
provide guidance that is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the 
amendments to [S]ection 704(c) and that is relatively simple for taxpayers to comply with 
and for the Internal Revenue Service to administer. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 105 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (as amended in 2005). With the exception of the remedial 
allocation method, discussed infra notes 115-120 and accompanying text, an allocation method is 
not reasonable if it involves notional allocations or requires the partnership to adjust its basis in 
contributed property to reflect precontribution gains or losses. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (as 
amended in 2005). Accordingly, the Section 704(c) Regulations expressly forbid the use of the 
deferred sales method. 
 106 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(2) (as amended in 2005).  
 107 Id. § 1.704-3(b)-(d). The use of these three allocation methods is subject to a general 
anti-abuse rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (as amended in 2005, and additional amendments to the 
anti-abuse rule proposed by Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10), 73 Fed. Reg. 28,765 (May 19, 
2008)). Under this anti-abuse rule, a partnership’s allocation method will not be considered 
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rule.108 Indeed, this is the previously elective approach of Section 
704(c)(2) of the 1954 Code.109 Despite the acknowledged inability of the 
traditional method to eliminate all book/tax disparities, Treasury simply 
was not prepared to repeal the ceiling rule.110   
But Treasury was prepared to provide partnerships with relief 
from the ceiling rule. The Section 704(c) Regulations permit partnerships 
to elect two alternative allocation methods, each reflecting the 
reemergence of the Substance Principle in the contributed property 
context. 
One of these methods is the traditional method with curative 
allocations.111 As its name suggests, the traditional method with curative 
allocations begins with the application of the traditional method subject 
to the ceiling rule. If the ceiling rule causes a book/tax disparity for a 
noncontributing partner, the partnership can make curative allocations of 
other existing tax items to alleviate the distortion.112 Curative allocations 
will only be respected to the extent they are reasonable, which requires 
that the tax item used to make the curative allocation have the same 
effect on the partners as the item limited by the ceiling rule.113  
The traditional method with curative allocations, however, is not 
a perfect solution to the problem of contributed property. Curative 
allocations can only be made with items actually recognized by the 
partnership. Thus, the success of this method is entirely dependent on the 
items the partnership recognizes.114 Absent the recognition of an item that 
  
reasonable if the contribution and subsequent contributed property allocations are made “with a view 
to shifting the tax consequences” of precontribution gains and losses “among the partners in a 
manner that substantially reduces the present value of the partners’ aggregate tax liability.” Id.  
 108 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b) (as amended in 2005).  
 109 For a more detailed discussion of the mechanics of the traditional method subject to 
the ceiling rule, see supra Part I.B.2. 
 110 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992) (“[T]he ceiling 
rule may prevent elimination of the entire effect of the disparity between the fair market value and 
adjusted basis in the partnership for the contributing partner and may create a disparity for the 
noncontributing partners. The proposed regulations retain the traditional method despite this 
potential for distortions.”). Many commentators have suggested that Treasury retained the ceiling 
rule due to concerns regarding its authority to administratively repeal such rule. See, e.g., Laura 
Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93, 95 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cunningham, Use and Abuse]; Marich & McKee, supra note 82, at 692, n.111; Steines, supra note 
82, at 665, n.173; see also Tax Simplification Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2777 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 102d Cong. (statement of David E. Peterson, Chairman of 
the Legislative Comm., Coalition of Publicly Traded Partnerships, noting that in the Coalition’s 
discussions with Treasury and IRS staff, it was revealed that Treasury doubted that they had the 
authority to eliminate the ceiling rule), reprinted in 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 159-28 (July 30, 1991). 
 111 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c) (as amended in 2005). For a helpful example of the 
application of the traditional method with curative allocations, see Simmons, supra note 18, 
manuscript at 13-15 (sale of contributed property) and 19-20 (depreciation of contributed property).  
 112 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2005).  
 113 Id. § 1.704-3(c)(3)(iii). Additionally, a curative allocation will only be reasonable to 
the extent it does not exceed the amount necessary to eliminate the book/tax disparity caused by the 
ceiling rule. Id. § 1.704-3(c)(3)(i).  
 114 If a partnership fails to recognize any items with which to make a reasonable curative 
allocation in the year a ceiling rule distortion arises, the partnership may make such curative 
allocation in a succeeding taxable year when it recognizes a proper item. Id. § 1. 704-3(c)(3)(ii). 
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happens to qualify as a reasonable curative allocation, the partnership is 
precluded from making a curative allocation and curing the ceiling rule 
distortion.     
Treasury’s last allocation method is the remedial allocation 
method.115 Like the traditional method with curative allocations, the 
  
 115 T.D. 8501, 1994-1 C.B. 191 (finalized by T.D. 8585, 1995-1 C.B. 120). Treasury did 
not include the remedial allocation method in the initial Section 704(c) Regulations proposed in 
1992. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992). Rather, such regulations 
included the deferred sales method. Id. However, when Treasury issued the final Section 704(c) 
Regulations in 1994, it reserved on the third allocation method and simultaneously issued proposed 
and temporary regulations introducing the remedial allocation method. T.D. 8500, 1994-1 C.B. 183. 
Treasury downplayed the shift from the deferred sales method to the remedial allocation method, 
stating in the preamble to temporary Treasury Regulation that  
[a]fter considering the many comments received concerning the deferred sale method and 
upon further review by the IRS and Treasury, it was determined that the results of the 
deferred sale method in the original proposed regulations could be achieved using a less 
complex method. Therefore, the IRS and Treasury have included a revised deferred sale 
method referred to as the remedial allocation method in these temporary regulations.  
Id. The deferred sales method and the remedial allocation method do share common traits—both 
eliminate ceiling rule distortions through the use of notional tax allocations. Yet the deferred sales 
method and the remedial allocation method differ in critical respects. Most importantly, the deferred 
sales method and the remedial allocation method treat contributions as fundamentally different 
transactions, and this difference reverberates through many aspects of the respective allocation rules. 
Indeed, many commentators believed that the deferred sales method’s integration into Subchapter K 
would present numerous challenges not evident with the remedial allocation method. See, e.g., 
COMM. ON P’SHIPS., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON TREASURY REGULATION 
SECTION 1.704-3T AND CERTAIN OTHER SECTION 704(C) MATTERS, reprinted in 94 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 86-15 (May 4, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 NYSBA COMMENTS]; TAXATION SECTION, D.C. BAR 
ASS’N, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATION SECTION 1.704-3 PERTAINING TO ALLOCATIONS IN 
CONNECTION WITH BUILT-IN GAIN OR LOSS PROPERTY CONTRIBUTED TO PARTNERSHIPS, reprinted 
in 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 84-32 (Apr. 16, 1993) [hereinafter DCBA COMMENTS].  
  The mechanics of the deferred sales method as set forth in the proposed Section 704(c) 
Regulations generally tracked the A.L.I.’s 1984 proposal, discussed supra Part I.C.2. However, 
Treasury’s formulation of the deferred sales method and the A.L.I.’s proposal differed in several 
notable respects. First, the proposed Section 704(c) Regulations clarified the triggering effect of 
subsequent distributions. Specifically, distributions to the contributing partner only would have 
triggered recognition of the deferred sales amount to the extent that the distributed property’s fair 
market value plus any cash distributed exceeded the contributing partner’s outside basis. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2)(ii)(B), 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992). Second, the proposed Section 
704(c) Regulations would have adopted a bifurcated approach to depreciation. Id. § 1.704-3(d)(7), 
57 Fed. Reg. 61,345. Under the proposed Section 704(c) Regulations, the partnership would have 
divided its inside basis in the contributed property into two components—one equal to the 
contributing partner’s basis in such property at contribution and the other equal to the remainder. 
The partnership would have depreciated the portion equal to the contributing partner’s basis on a 
step in the shoes basis using the contributed property’s remaining recovery period. By contrast, the 
partnership would have depreciated the remaining portion, which would equal the deferred sales 
amount, as newly placed in service property using a fresh recovery period. Id. Although Treasury did 
not include the deferred sales method in the final Section 704(c) Regulations, the bifurcated 
depreciation approach survived and governs the depreciation of contributed property under the 
remedial allocation method. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2), (7) ex. 1 (as amended in 2005).  
  Treasury’s deferred sales method proposal was virtually identical to prior, 
unsuccessful congressional proposals. Specifically, on several occasions, Congress tried to enact 
legislation that would have required large partnerships—those having at least 250 members—to use 
the deferred sales method. See Revenue Act of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong. § 4301(a), reprinted in 92 
TAX NOTES TODAY 203-96 (Oct. 7, 1992) (pocket vetoed by President Bush on November 5, 1992); 
Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992, H.R. 4210, 102d Cong. § 4301(a), 
reprinted in 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 66-20 (Mar. 26, 1992) (vetoed by President Bush at 138 Cong. 
Rec. H. 1604 (March 24, 1992)); Tax Simplification Act of 1991, H.R. 2777, 102d Cong. § 201, 
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remedial allocation method uses the traditional method as its baseline, 
only deviating from it when the ceiling rule causes a book/tax disparity 
for a noncontributing partner.116 If the ceiling rule applies, the partnership 
makes a notional allocation to the affected noncontributing partner in 
order to eliminate her book/tax disparity.117 Simultaneously, the 
partnership makes an offsetting notional allocation to the contributing 
partner.118 The sole purpose of these allocations is to remedy ceiling rule 
distortions, and they are otherwise invisible to the partnership.119 Because 
the remedial allocations offset one another, the partnership’s aggregate 
taxable income or loss remains unchanged. Further, remedial allocations 
are made for tax purposes only; they have no effect on the partners’ 
capital accounts.120 Simply put, remedial allocations are offsetting 
fictional allocations intended to eliminate the problems—shifting and 
book/tax disparities—perpetuated by the ceiling rule. 
For the most part, the Section 704(c) Regulations remain the 
primary rules governing allocations attributable to contributed property. 
A partnership may elect between these three alternative allocation 
regimes, each with its own idiosyncrasies, and it may make such election 
on a property-by-property basis.121 Consistent with much of Subchapter 
K, flexibility reigns supreme within the Section 704(c) Regulations. Yet 
partnerships also have the opportunity to achieve results more consistent 
with the Substance Principle through either curative allocations or 
remedial allocations.  
Perhaps, however, the Section 704(c) Regulations are best 
described as a Pyrrhic victory for Congress and Treasury. The current 
Section 704(c) allocation regime does reflect both of Congress’s primary 
goals for Subchapter K—flexibility and the Substance Principle. But, as 
  
reprinted in 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 138-24 (June 28, 1991) (failed to reach floor vote in House of 
Representatives); STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 101ST CONG., WIDELY HELD PARTNERSHIPS: 
COMPLIANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (Comm. Print 1990); 138 Cong. Rec. H1604 (1992); 
Library of Congress: Thomas, S.1394, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c102:10:. 
/temp/~c1025TjONg:: (follow “Bill Summary & Status file” hyperlink; then follow “All 
Congressional Actions” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (on file with author); Library of 
Congress: Thomas, H.R. 11, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HR00011:@@@R (last 
visited June 15, 2009).  
 116 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d) (as amended in 2005). For a helpful example of the 
application of the traditional method with remedial allocations, see Simmons, supra note 18, 
manuscript at 15-16 (sale of contributed property) and 20-22 (depreciation of contributed property).  
 117 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(1), (7) exs. 1 & 2 (as amended in 2005).  
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. § 1.704-3(d)(3), (4)(ii). 
 120 Id. § 1.704-3(d)(4)(i), (ii). 
 121 For instance, as discussed supra note 115, the remedial allocation method has a unique 
approach to depreciation. Neither the traditional method nor the traditional method with curative 
allocations applies this approach. Rather, they follow a step-in-the-shoes approach to depreciation. 
In addition, as discussed supra note 114, the traditional method with curative allocations permits a 
partnership to make curative allocations in the years following the year in which the noncontributing 
partner’s ceiling rule distortion arises. By contrast, the other allocation methods require a partnership 
to make all necessary allocations in the taxable year the noncontributing partner’s ceiling rule 
distortion occurs.  
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Part II of this Article explains, the cost of Congress’s failure to choose 
between flexibility and the Substance Principle has been quite high. And 
the enactment of Section 704(c)(1)(C) in 2004 only exacerbated this 
predicament.            
F. The Enactment of Section 704(c)(1)(C)  
In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress amended 
Section 704(c) in order to thwart certain loss shifting partnership 
transactions.122 The stated goal of Section 704(c)(1)(C) was to prevent the 
transfer of precontribution losses, but the amendment’s impact is far 
broader.123 When applicable, Section 704(c)(1)(C) provides a mandatory 
allocation rule entirely consistent with the Substance Principle. Simply 
put, Section 704(c)(1)(C) partially repeals the ceiling rule. 
Under Section 704(c)(1)(C), a partnership may not allocate any 
portion of a precontribution loss to a partner other than the contributing 
partner.124 Indeed, built in losses are disregarded for purposes of making 
allocations to noncontributing partners.125 To this end, the partnership 
treats built in loss property as if it had been acquired in a taxable 
exchange and takes an inside basis in such property equal to its fair 
market value at contribution.126 Accordingly, when future taxable events 
occur, such as a sale of the contributed property, the noncontributing 
  
 122 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833(a), 188 Stat. 1418, 
1589 (2004) (codified in I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)).  
 123 See STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 108TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 384-86 (Comm. Print 2005); H.R. REP. NO. 108-
755, at 621 (2004) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 281-83 (2004). Indeed, the legislative 
history of Section 704(c)(1)(C) focuses primarily on transactions in which precontribution losses are 
duplicated following the transfer of the contributing partner’s partnership interest. Under certain 
circumstances, a subsequent sale of the contributed property will improperly duplicate and shift such 
precontribution losses to the remaining partners, including the transferee partner. Notwithstanding 
this narrow focus, the relevant legislative history specifies a much broader underlying concern—the 
improper transfer of built in losses among partners. See STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 108TH 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 384-86 
(Comm. Print 2005); H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 283 (2004). Thus, Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s legislative 
history is ambiguous. It is unclear whether Congress intended the provision to prevent all shifts of 
precontribution losses or only those occurring following the contributing partner’s sale of her 
partnership interest. As will be discussed, the literal language of Section 704(c)(1)(C), by contrast to 
the legislative history, is quite clear. For a more detailed discussion of these transactions and the 
intended effect of Section 704(c)(1)(C), see generally Darryll Jones, It’s the Ceiling Rule Stupid!, 
107 TAX NOTES 1579 (June 20, 2005); Lukasz Rachuba, New Issues with Partnership Built-In Loss 
Property, 107 TAX NOTES 1569 (June 20, 2005).  
 124 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006). The following analysis is based on a literal reading of 
Section 704(c)(1)(C). As discussed supra note 123, the language of Section 704(c)(1)(C) is not 
ambiguous. Section 704(c)(1)(C) applies “if any property so contributed [to a partnership] has a 
built-in loss.” Id. For a less literalist reading of Section 704(c)(1)(C), see Simmons, supra note 18, 
manuscript at 52-82.  
 125 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)(ii). Section 704(c)(1)(C)(ii) controls built in loss property 
allocations made to “other partners.” That is, it governs allocations made to partners other than the 
contributing partner, including noncontributing partners and any transferee partners. 
 126 Id. § 704(c)(1)(C) (flush language). A “built in loss” is the excess of the contributed 
property’s adjusted basis over its fair market value at contribution. Id.  
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partner will receive parallel book and tax allocations. No new book/tax 
disparities will arise and no losses will shift from the contributing partner 
to the noncontributing partner.   
However, Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s applicability is quite limited. 
The provision only applies to built in loss property contributed to a 
partnership. And even in these circumstances, Section 704(c)(1)(C) does 
not apply to all of the partnership’s allocations. Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
only applies when the partnership makes allocations attributable to such 
built in loss property to the noncontributing partner. Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
does not govern allocations made to the contributing partner; these 
allocations remain subject to the historic rules of Section 704(c), now set 
forth in Section 704(c)(1)(A).127 Allocations attributable to built in gain 
property also fall outside Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s parameters and, 
therefore, partnerships continue to make these allocations under Section 
704(c)(1)(A).128 In essence, Section 704(c)(1)(C) bifurcated the rules 
governing allocations attributable to contributed property: Section 
704(c)(1)(C) governs allocations attributable to built in loss property 
made to noncontributing partners, and Section 704(c)(1)(A) governs all 
other allocations attributable to contributed property.  
To illustrate, consider Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s effect on Example 
1. Prior to Section 704(c)(1)(C), the partnership would have recognized a 
$50 book gain on Blackacre’s sale for $250 ($250 amount realized minus 
$200 book value). The partnership would have allocated each partner a 
$25 book gain, increasing her capital account from $200 to $225. By 
contrast, the partnership would have recognized a $50 tax loss on the sale 
($250 amount realized minus $300 inside basis), and the ceiling rule 
would have governed the allocation of such loss.129 Accordingly, the 
partnership would have allocated the entire $50 tax loss to B. As 
discussed, the application of the ceiling rule would have resulted in 
distortions, each reflecting Section 704(c)(1)(A)’s failure to comply with 
the Substance Principle. Specifically, A and B would have had $25 
book/tax disparities, and $25 of Blackacre’s precontribution loss would 
have shifted from B to A.    
Section 704(c)(1)(C) alters the tax consequences of Blackacre’s 
sale.130 The partnership must now bifurcate the transaction and determine 
  
 127 In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Congress amended Section 
704(c). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7642, 103 Stat. 2106, 
2380 (1989). Former Section 704(c) was redesignated Section 704(c)(1)(A), and the Section 
704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, discussed supra Part II.B.4.a., was added to the Code.  
 128 In addition, Section 704(c)(1)(C) does not apply to reverse Section 704(c) allocations, 
discussed supra note 97. 
 129 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2005). For purposes of this illustration, 
it is assumed that the partnership did not elect to apply the traditional method with curative 
allocations or the remedial allocation method, either of which may have cured the ceiling rule 
distortion.  
 130 For capital account purposes, the consequences of Blackacre’s sale would remain 
unchanged. Like before Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment, the partnership would recognize a $50 
book gain and allocate it equally between A and B. 
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A’s and B’s tax consequences separately. The partnership’s allocations to 
B, the contributing partner, would remain subject to Section 
704(c)(1)(A). The partnership would recognize a $50 tax loss, which it 
would allocate entirely to B because of the ceiling rule. Thus, B would 
have a $25 book/tax disparity following Blackacre’s sale ($225 capital 
account versus $250 outside basis).  
By contrast, the partnership would determine A’s tax 
consequences under Section 704(c)(1)(C). As discussed, a partnership 
disregards precontribution losses when making allocations to a 
noncontributing partner under Section 704(c)(1)(C). Accordingly, the 
partnership would not account for Blackacre’s $100 precontribution loss 
when determining the A’s tax consequences. To this end, the 
partnership’s inside basis in Blackacre would be $200, the property’s fair 
market value at contribution. The partnership would recognize a $50 tax 
gain on the sale ($250 amount realized minus $200 Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
inside basis) and allocate $25 of such tax gain to A. Accordingly, A 
would receive matching book and tax allocations following Blackacre’s 
sale.  
Table 6: Allocations under Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
 A B 
 Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial 
Balance 
200 200 200 300 
Sale-
704(c)(1)(A) 
  25 (50) 
Sale-
704(c)(1)(C) 
25 25   
Ending 
Balance 
225 225 225 250 
 
To the extent applicable, Section 704(c)(1)(C) repeals the ceiling 
rule and aligns the rules governing allocations attributable to contributed 
property and the Substance Principle. In the foregoing example, A would 
not have a book/tax disparity following Blackacre’s sale. In addition, 
none of Blackacre’s $100 precontribution loss would shift from B to A. 
By eliminating the precontribution loss from the partnership’s inside 
basis, Section 704(c)(1)(C) ensures that no portion of such loss inures to 
the benefit of the noncontributing partner. Indeed, the ceiling rule no 
longer causes book/tax disparities or loss shifting for noncontributing 
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partners. Under Section 704(c)(1)(C), the right noncontributing partner 
pays tax on the right amount at the right time.131 
More importantly, Section 704(c)(1)(C) highlights a fundamental 
shift in congressional thinking about Subchapter K. Throughout the 
years, Congress has remained steadfast in its commitment to promoting 
both flexibility and the Substance Principle in Section 704(c) and, more 
broadly, in Subchapter K. Section 704(c)(1)(C) reflects Congress’s 
recognition of the high cost of such approach. Congress has 
demonstrated a newfound willingness to choose between flexibility and 
the Substance Principle, and Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment is an 
example of such trend. Indeed, Congress’s choice has been the Substance 
Principle. 
II. THE SOLUTION: THE DEFERRED SALES METHOD 
A. The Unraveling of the Impossible Balancing Act 
Despite the commendable policy shift reflected in Section 
704(c)(1)(C), its practical effect is disastrous. As discussed, the 
enactment of Section 704(c)(1)(C) split the rules governing allocations 
attributable to contributed property into two fundamentally distinct 
allocation regimes. Section 704(c)(1)(A) and Section 704(c)(1)(C) have 
different theoretical bases and unique compliance requirements. Hence, 
these allocation regimes require separate administrative infrastructures. 
Simply put, Section 704(c)(1)(C) necessitates a foundational 
  
 131 Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s application, however, does result in a new distortion—the 
partners’ aggregate outside basis in their partnership interests exceeds the partnership’s aggregate 
inside basis in its property. After Blackacre’s sale, A and B would have an aggregate outside basis of 
$475, but the partnership would have an aggregate inside basis of $450. The inside/outside basis 
mismatch results from the application of different allocation rules to different partners. The 
traditional rule of Section 704(c)(1)(A), including the ceiling rule, applies to the contributing partner, 
and Section 704(c)(1)(C) applies to the noncontributing partner. A remedial allocation to the 
contributing partner would solve this problem. Specifically, if the partnership made a remedial loss 
allocation to the contributing partner equal to the gain recognized by the noncontributing partner, 
such remedial allocation would eliminate the inside/outside basis disparity. As will be discussed 
infra note 143, the Section 704(c) Regulations do not permit a remedial allocation to the contributing 
partner under these circumstances. Thus, Treasury would have to authorize such remedial allocations 
through a revision of the Section 704(c) Regulations or the issuance of regulations under Section 
704(c)(1)(C).  
  Interestingly, one of the primary objections to a literalist application of Section 
704(c)(1)(C) is that such application results in this inside/outside basis disparity. Simmons, supra 
note 18, manuscript at 55 (“The inside/outside basis disparity created by this [literalist] analysis 
suggests that the result is not correct.”). Specifically, the inside/outside basis disparity reflects the 
impermissible recognition of notional tax items by the noncontributing partner without a 
corresponding recognition of gain at the partnership level. Id. at 55-56. As will be discussed infra 
Part III.C.2, Congress has increasingly used notional allocations to prevent abuse and better align 
Subchapter K and the Substance Principle. Accordingly, a literalist application of Section 
704(c)(1)(C) should not be rejected because it would result in the noncontributing partner 
recognizing notional tax gains. On the contrary, such notional tax allocations would eliminate the 
shifting of built in losses and, therefore, better align the rules governing allocations attributable to 
contributed property and the Substance Principle—at least with respect to the noncontributing 
partner. 
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transformation in the way that partnerships make allocations attributable 
to contributed property. 
Prior to Section 704(c)(1)(C), contributed property allocations 
were governed exclusively by Section 704(c)(1)(A) and the Section 
704(c) Regulations. Likewise, this Section 704(c)(1)(A) regime 
continues to govern the majority of such allocations, including 
allocations attributable to built in gain property and allocations related to 
built in loss property if made to the contributing partner.132 Like much of 
Subchapter K, the Section 704(c)(1)(A) allocation regime strives to 
maximize partnership flexibility. To this end, Section 704(c)(1)(A) offers 
a partnership a choice of three different allocation methodologies—some 
simple, some more equitable—that it may select on a property-by-
property basis.133 Although all three methods share common roots in the 
traditional method subject to the ceiling rule, each allocation 
methodology is distinctive, possessing its own unique complexities and 
idiosyncrasies.134 To state the obvious, the simultaneous application of 
three independent allocation methodologies, each the subject of highly 
technical regulations, is anything but simple. 
Nonetheless, Congress enacted Section 704(c)(1)(C), thereby 
introducing an entirely foreign allocation regime into the already 
complicated world of Section 704(c). Despite its limited applicability, 
Section 704(c)(1)(C) requires the creation of a new regulatory 
framework. Unlike Section 704(c)(1)(A), Section 704(c)(1)(C) is 
anchored in the Substance Principle and treats a partnership contribution 
as a deferred taxable exchange. Accordingly, Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
necessarily requires a different administrative infrastructure to reflect its 
equity-based foundations and unique compliance requirements. Perhaps 
more challenging, Section 704(c)(1)(C) forces partnerships to adapt to a 
fundamentally different way of thinking about allocations attributable to 
contributed property—at least for the modest number of allocations to 
which Section 704(c)(1)(C) applies.  
Viewed independently, Section 704(c)(1)(A) and Section 
704(c)(1)(C) are both challenging provisions, each raising distinct 
administrative and complexity concerns. Taken together, Section 
  
 132 In addition, reverse Section 704(c) allocations, discussed supra note 97, remain 
subject to Section 704(c)(1)(A). 
 133 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1), (2) (as amended in 2005).  
 134 All three of the allocation methodologies set forth in the Section 704(c) Regulations 
begin with the application of the traditional method subject to the ceiling rule. Indeed, the 
partnership’s ability to make curative allocations or remedial allocations is only triggered by a 
noncontributing partner suffering a ceiling rule distortion. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1), (d)(1) (as 
amended in 2005). See, e.g., Barksdale Hortenstine & Gregory J. Marich, An Analysis of the Rules 
Governing Partnership Allocations with respect to Contributed Properties: The Final Regulations 
under Section 704(c), 581 PRAC. L. INST. TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HAND BOOK 
SERIES 1295, 1316 (2003) (describing the Section 704(c) Regulations as having “one horse in the 
barn”, and identifying such “horse” as the traditional method subject to the ceiling rule). 
Notwithstanding these common roots, each allocation methodology has its own unique attributes. 
See supra note 121 for examples of such attributes. 
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704(c)(1)(A) and Section 704(c)(1)(C) elevate the complexity of Section 
704(c) to critical levels.  Simply put, the current bifurcated Section 
704(c) allocation regime compromises the integrity of the rules 
governing allocations attributable to contributed property. And in doing 
so, it endangers the heart of Subchapter K—its allocation provisions.  
Let me consider two arguments that might defend this bifurcated 
allocation regime. First, one might assert that the complexity of current 
law is overstated, particularly when technological advances are 
considered. Second, one might argue that Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s positive 
effect on equity and abuse prevention justifies the increased complexity 
resulting from its passage. As will be discussed, neither of these 
arguments is persuasive.   
The first argument would maintain that modern partnerships are 
better equipped than their predecessors to handle Subchapter K’s 
complexity, including the bifurcated Section 704(c) regime. As 
Subchapter K has grown increasingly complex, partnerships and 
technology have adapted. Programmers have developed sophisticated 
computer models that accomplish many of the computations and 
allocations, including Section 704(c) allocations, previously performed 
manually.135 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the commercial 
environment will adapt to Section 704(c)(1)(C) and any regulations 
related thereto, and capable analysts will develop models that account for 
allocations governed by such rules. 
Even so, the complexity of Subchapter K and the sophistication 
of partnerships are not the only variables that determine whether Section 
704(c) remains viable. One must also consider the number of business 
entities subject to Subchapter K and the Internal Revenue Service’s 
enforcement activities. And these later variables clearly demonstrate 
Section 704(c)’s fatal flaws.  
In 1997, Treasury adopted the “check the box” regulations, 
which permit unincorporated business associations, such as limited 
liability companies, to elect whether to be taxed as corporations or as 
partnerships under Subchapter K.136 Since that time, the number of 
entities electing to be taxed under Subchapter K has grown dramatically 
due primarily to the rise of the limited liability company.137 Indeed, there 
has been explosive growth in the number of business entities electing to 
be treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes, and this trend 
is expected to continue.138  
  
 135 See 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 138; see also R. Donald Turlington, 
Section 704(c) and Partnership Book-Tax Disparities, The Ceiling Rule and the Art of Tax 
Avoidance, 46 INST. ON FED. TAX’N. 26, § 26.08 (1988).  
 136 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2008); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as 
amended in 2006).  
 137 See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 138 See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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In turn, as the number of entities subject to Subchapter K has 
increased, so too have the Service’s enforcement needs. Historically, 
enforcement rates in Subchapter K have been extraordinarily low when 
compared to enforcement in other income tax contexts.139 And this 
disparity has yet to be corrected, despite more than a decade of “check 
the box” and the resulting increase in the number of entities governed by 
Subchapter K.140 There is, therefore, especially little reason to expect that 
the enforcement resources dedicated to Subchapter K will be sufficient to 
keep pace with the explosive growth in the number of entities electing to 
be treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.     
Accordingly, Subchapter K is poised for a perfect storm. The 
dramatic increase in the number of entities electing to be taxed under 
Subchapter K and the lack of necessary enforcement resources has 
placed great stress on an already fragile system. Under these challenging 
circumstances, Section 704(c)(1)(C) is simply too much. The rules 
governing allocations attributable to contributed property cannot 
withstand the pressure of a bifurcated Section 704(c) allocation regime.   
The second argument defending Section 704(c)(1)(C) would 
assert that the provision’s additional complexity is justified by increased 
equity and decreased abuse. Yet because Section 704(c)(1)(C) applies to 
such a narrow universe of allocations, its benefits are necessarily limited. 
Section 704(c)(1)(C) only prevents abuse with respect to those 
allocations that fall within its modest parameters. Although Section 
704(c)(1)(C) prevents loss shifting transactions, Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
fails to address the related problem of income shifting. Thus, an 
opportunistic partnership may continue to allocate precontribution gains 
so as to shift income among its partners.141  
Additionally, Section 704(c)(1)(C) fails to provide 
comprehensive results consistent with the Substance Principle. Again, 
Section 704(c)(1)(C) does not govern allocations involving built in gain 
property and, therefore, such allocations are deprived of the benefit of 
the perfect alignment between Section 704(c)(1)(C) and the Substance 
Principle.142  
Also, Section 704(c)(1)(C) denies partners contributing built in 
loss property an equitable result. Indeed, the tax consequences to a 
contributing partner are far less equitable today than prior to Section 
704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment. A contributing partner no longer has the 
option to eliminate book/tax disparities attributable to built in loss 
property following the application of the ceiling rule. That is, a partner 
  
 139 See sources cited supra note 6. 
 140 See sources cited supra note 6. 
 141 As discussed supra note 107, the Section 704(c) Regulations contain an anti-abuse 
rule. Accordingly, a partnership can only shift precontribution gains and losses to the extent that the 
underlying allocations do not violate this anti-abuse rule. 
 142 Additionally, Section 704(c)(1)(C) does not apply to reverse Section 704(c) 
allocations.  
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contributing built in loss property is currently denied the benefit of the 
alternative Section 704(c)(1)(A) allocation rules—the traditional method 
with curative allocations and the remedial allocation method—intended 
to cure ceiling rule distortions.143 Accordingly, Section 704(c)(1)(C) 
affords a contributing partner less equity and less flexibility than such 
partner had under prior law.  
Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s modest applicability invariably mitigates 
its beneficial impact on equity and abuse. Yet despite its limited 
applicability, Section 704(c)(1)(C) is a disaster from a complexity 
perspective. Thus, absent more definitive support for the proposition that 
Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s profoundly adverse effect on the complexity of 
Section 704(c) is outweighed by increases in equity and decreases in 
abuse, such proposition must fail. And Congress must reconsider the 
current bifurcated Section 704(c) allocation regime. If Subchapter K is to 
weather this perfect storm, Congress must fundamentally reform the 
rules governing allocations attributable to contributed property. 
B. Shelter from the Storm: The Deferred Sales Method 
In failure, however, Section 704(c)(1)(C) may have found its 
greatest success. Section 704(c)(1)(C) has devastated the rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property, and congressional action 
is urgently needed to salvage these rules. Indeed, repairing the damage 
caused by Section 704(c)(1)(C) may force Congress to make the choice 
between flexibility and the Substance Principle that it has skillfully 
avoided for more than fifty years. And this would be an extraordinary 
achievement, particularly for a provision as flawed as Section 
704(c)(1)(C).   
It is time for Congress to solve the problem of contributed 
property. To this end, Congress must choose the Substance Principle and 
  
 143 Under Section 704(c)(1)(C), a contributing partner’s book/tax disparity cannot be 
remedied through the application of an alternative allocation methodology. Put another way, the 
traditional method with curative allocations and the remedial allocation method are no longer 
available to partners contributing built in loss property. Because Section 704(c)(1)(A) governs the 
partnership’s allocations to the contributing partner, the Section 704(c) Regulations also apply. 
Under these regulations, the availability of the traditional method with curative allocations or the 
remedial allocation method hinges on the occurrence of one triggering event—a noncontributing 
partner developing a book/tax disparity. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1), (d)(1) (as amended in 2005). If 
the ceiling rule’s application does not create a book/tax disparity for a noncontributing partner, the 
partnership may not make curative or remedial allocations to any partner, including the contributing 
partner. And herein lies the problem. Under Section 704(c)(1)(C), the noncontributing partner will 
always receive equal book and tax allocations and will never develop a book/tax disparity. 
Accordingly, the partnership will not have the ability to correct the contributing partner’s lingering 
book/tax disparity through curative allocations or remedial allocations. Unless and until the 
contributing partner disposes of her partnership interest or the partnership liquidates, the contributing 
partner’s book/tax disparity will remain. This problem could be solved through a revision of the 
Section 704(c) Regulations or the issuance of regulations under Section 704(c)(1)(C). Specifically, 
such regulations could permit the partnership to make a remedial allocation to the contributing 
partner to the extent necessary to eliminate any book/tax disparity remaining following the 
partnership’s sale of the contributed property.  
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abandon flexibility. Congress must adopt the deferred sales method as 
the exclusive means of allocating all items attributable to contributed 
property.  
1. The Adoption of the Deferred Sales Method  
The deferred sales method would require partnerships to make 
all allocations attributable to contributed property in a manner entirely 
consistent with the Substance Principle.144 Unlike current law, the 
deferred sales method would treat property contributions as taxable 
exchanges between the contributing partner and the partnership.145 
Notwithstanding this characterization, the contributing partner would 
recognize no gain or loss at contribution. Rather, such gain or loss would 
be deferred for future recognition and retained as the contributing 
partner’s deferred sales amount. Consistent with exchange treatment, the 
partnership would take an inside basis in the contributed property equal 
to such property’s fair market value at contribution.146 Thus, any 
precontribution gain or loss would remain with the contributing partner, 
captured in her deferred sales amount.  The contributing partner’s initial 
outside basis in her partnership interest would be her basis in the 
contributed property prior to contribution.   
The contributing partner would recognize the deferred sales 
amount when certain triggering events occur.147 The partnership’s 
disposition of the contributed property or the contributing partner’s 
disposition of her partnership interest both would trigger the recognition 
of the deferred sales amount.148 Similarly, the contributing partner would 
recognize the deferred sales amount on receipt of a distribution or on the 
partnership’s distribution of the contributing property.149 
  
 144  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 145 In addition, the deferred sales method would govern all reverse Section 704(c) 
allocations, which are discussed supra note 97. 
 146 Hence, Section 723 would require amendment. As previously discussed, supra note 27 
and accompanying text, Section 723 currently provides that the partnership’s initial inside basis in 
contributed property equals such property’s precontribution basis in the hands of the contributing 
partner.  
 147 After the contributing partner’s recognition of all or any portion of her deferred sales 
amount, such partner would have to adjust her outside basis to reflect the recognition of this amount. 
Accordingly, Congress would have to amend Section 705 to permit such adjustment. 
 148 If the partnership disposed of the contributed property in a nonrecognition transaction, 
for example, in a like kind exchange under Section 1031, the contributing partner’s recognition of 
the deferred sales amount would be deferred. The partnership would treat the property received in 
the nonrecognition transaction just like the contributed property. Accordingly, a subsequent 
disposition or distribution of such property would trigger the contributing partner’s recognition of 
the deferred sales amount. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992). For 
a comprehensive discussion of the deferred sales method’s application in various contexts, including 
like kind exchanges, see Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 82, at 28-35.  
 149 To some extent, distributions to the contributing partner would trigger only partial 
recognition of the deferred sales amount. If the cash or the distributed property’s fair market value is 
less than the contributed property’s fair market value at contribution, the distribution would not 
trigger recognition of the entire deferred sales amount. Rather, the contributing partner would 
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Also, the deferred sales method would affect the depreciation of 
contributed property. Because the contribution would be characterized as 
a taxable exchange between the partner and the partnership, the 
partnership would treat the contributed property as newly placed in 
service property.150 Accordingly, the partnership would depreciate the 
contributed property using the appropriate methodology and a new 
recovery period.151   
Throughout the property’s recovery period, the contributing 
partner would incrementally recognize her deferred sales amount. The 
portion of the deferred sales amount recognized annually would be 
computed by reference to the partnership’s inside basis in the contributed 
property. Specifically, the contributing partner would recognize a portion 
of the deferred sales amount proportionate to the amount of the 
partnership’s initial inside basis recovered through its annual 
depreciation deduction.  
The deferred sales method would successfully align the rules 
governing allocations attributable to contributed property and the 
Substance Principle. In so doing, the deferred sales method would solve 
the problem of contributed property. Because the deferred sales method 
would quarantine precontribution gains and losses with the contributing 
partner, such gains and losses would not be reflected in the partnership’s 
inside basis in the contributed property. Accordingly, no precontribution 
gains or losses would shift from the contributing partner to the 
noncontributing partner, and no noncontributing partner would develop a 
  
recognize a portion of the deferred sales amount computed by reference to a hypothetical partial sale 
of the contributed property. Specifically, the amount of the deferred sales amount recognized would 
equal the amount of the contributed property’s built in gain or loss that would have been recognized 
at contribution if the contributing partner had exchanged a portion of the contributed property for the 
cash or property ultimately distributed. Because of the variation in partnership distributions, a de 
minimis exception to this partial recognition rule may be appropriate. In addition, if the partnership 
distributed the contributed property to the contributing partner, the contributing partner would not 
recognize the deferred sales amount. On the contrary, her basis in the contributed property would be 
adjusted to reflect the deferred sales amount.  
 150 Since the partnership would no longer follow a “step in the shoes” depreciation 
approach, Congress would have to amend Section 168(i)(7) to exclude partnership contributions 
from such approach.  
 151 Although the deferred sales method would stretch depreciation deductions when 
compared to current law, a restarted recovery period is most consistent with the deferred sales 
method’s characterization of the contribution as a taxable exchange. Further, to some extent, 
decelerating the depreciation of contributed property would eliminate a troublesome opportunity for 
tax-motivated behavior. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220, 225 
(2d Cir. 2006). By contrast, as discussed supra note 115, Treasury proposed a bifurcated 
depreciation approach under the deferred sales method. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 61,345 (Dec. 24, 1992). Indeed, the remedial allocation method currently follows this 
depreciation approach. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2) (as amended in 2005). Although the bifurcated 
depreciation approach is a reasonable compromise position, reflecting the hybrid nature of 
partnership contributions, a restarted recovery period would provide a better balance between equity, 
abuse prevention, and simplicity. For a detailed discussion, including helpful examples, of the tax 
consequences associated with the choice of recovery period, see Hortenstine & Marich, supra note 
134, at 1360-66; Gregory J. Marich et al., The Remedial Allocation Method: A Viable Cure for the 
Ceiling Rule, 65 TAX NOTES 1267, 1272-75 (1994).  
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book/tax disparity. Further, the contributing partner’s book/tax disparity 
would be eliminated when she recognized her deferred sales amount. 
The deferred sales method would harmonize the rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property and the Substance 
Principle. Absent any additional benefits, this harmonization would 
adequately justify the deferred sales method’s adoption. Even so, the 
deferred sales method would offer additional benefits no alternative 
allocation methodology can replicate. It would unify the rules governing 
allocations attributable to contributed property and streamline the rules 
governing allocations generally. Simply put, the deferred sales method 
would simplify Subchapter K. 
2. The Simplification of Section 704(c)  
The deferred sales method would dramatically simplify the rules 
governing allocations attributable to contributed property. The adoption 
of a unitary approach to Section 704(c) allocations would invariably 
alleviate the complexity of current law, where a partnership may 
simultaneously make contributed property allocations under four 
different rules. This simplification gain, however, is not unique to the 
deferred sales method. The transition to any uniform allocation 
methodology would ease the administrative and compliance burden of 
Section 704(c). 
But the deferred sales method’s impact beyond the boundaries of 
Section 704(c) is unique among the Section 704(c) allocation 
methodologies. By contrast to alternative methodologies, the 
simplification gains achieved by the deferred sales method produce a 
ripple effect throughout Subchapter K. Indeed, the deferred sales method 
would ameliorate the current complexity of Section 704 and, more 
broadly, Subchapter K.  
3. The Simplification of Section 704  
A distinctive benefit of the deferred sales method is its broader, 
synchronizing effect on Section 704, particularly the Section 704(b) 
general allocation rules. The deferred sales method would merge the 
rules governing allocations attributable to contributed property into the 
Section 704(b) substantial economic effect regime, thereby streamlining 
partnership allocations generally. 
As discussed supra, partnership allocations will only be 
respected to the extent such allocations have substantial economic 
effect.152 In turn, substantial economic effect requires that a partnership’s 
tax allocations parallel its economic allocations. If a partnership cannot 
  
 152 See supra Part I.A. 
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make identical allocations for book and tax purposes following a taxable 
event, such tax allocations will not have substantial economic effect.  
Herein lies the problem with contributed property. Because the 
treatment of a partnership contribution differs for capital account 
purposes and tax purposes, future taxable events do not result in equal 
book and tax allocations and, therefore, such tax allocations lack 
substantial economic effect. Indeed, in enacting Section 704(c), 
Congress’s goal was to provide partnerships with guidance regarding 
these common allocations necessarily falling outside the substantial 
economic effect safe harbor.  
The deferred sales method would solve the problem of 
contributed property and, thus, a partnership’s contributed property 
allocations could have substantial economic effect. Unlike current law, 
the deferred sales method would treat a partnership contribution as a 
taxable exchange. In so doing, the contribution transaction would be 
treated consistently for capital account purposes and tax purposes.153 
When future taxable events occur, for example, a sale of the contributed 
property, the resulting book and tax consequences would be identical. 
Thus, such contributed property allocations would have substantial 
economic effect to the extent they otherwise comply with the 
requirements of the substantial economic effect safe harbor.  
Simply put, the deferred sales method would permit a 
partnership to allocate items attributable to contributed property just like 
it allocates partnership items generally—under the Section 704(b) 
substantial economic effect rules. Synchronizing Section 704(c) and 
Section 704(b) would increase the uniformity of partnership allocations, 
thereby reducing the complexity of the Section 704 allocation rules. Of 
equal importance, Section 704’s simplification would fortify the 
allocation provisions lying at the heart of Subchapter K.    
4. The Simplification of Subchapter K  
The deferred sales method’s simplifying effect extends well 
beyond Section 704 and partnership allocations. Indeed, the deferred 
sales method would achieve a goal considered impossible by many. The 
deferred sales method would render obsolete a series of complex anti-
abuse rules, referred to as the mixing bowl rules and the disguised sale 
rule. In so doing, these provisions would become the proper subject of 
congressional repeal, thereby streamlining Subchapter K.154   
Each of these anti-abuse rules aims to prevent transactions 
capitalizing on the combination of partnership contributions and 
  
 153 Indeed, several commentators have noted that the deferred sales method would 
eliminate the need for partnerships to maintain separate books for tax and capital account purposes. 
See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 82, at 16. 
 154 See id. at 22. 
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distributions. Like contributions, when a partnership makes a 
distribution, neither the partner nor the partnership typically recognizes a 
gain or loss.155 Accordingly, throughout the years, opportunistic 
partnerships developed transactions combining contributions and 
distributions in order to avoid the recognition of income or loss 
attributable to contributed property. Congress responded by enacting 
three complex anti-abuse regimes intended to eliminate these 
transactions.   
a. Avoidance Transaction #1: Income and Loss Shifting  
Prior to the enactment of these anti-abuse regimes, a contributing 
partner could shift precontribution gains and losses, thereby avoiding 
recognition of such amounts, if she contributed property to the 
partnership and the partnership later distributed the property to another 
partner. To illustrate, consider the following Example 3. J and K formed 
an equal partnership with J contributing $500 cash and K contributing 
Orangeacre. At contribution, Orangeacre had a fair market value of $500 
and a basis of $100. K recognized no gain at contribution, and her 
outside basis in her partnership interest was $100.156 The partnership took 
an inside basis of $100 in Orangeacre, thereby preserving the property’s 
$400 precontribution gain for future recognition.157  
If the partnership distributed Orangeacre to J when the 
property’s fair market value was $500, neither J nor the partnership 
would have recognized any gain.158 J would have taken a $100 basis in 
Orangeacre, the partnership’s inside basis in the property prior to 
distribution.159 Orangeacre’s $400 precontribution gain would have been 
preserved for future recognition, even though the property would have 
left the partnership. Indeed, the distribution would have shifted such 
$400 precontribution gain from K to J. K would have received the 
economic benefit of Orangeacre’s appreciation at contribution, as 
reflected in her $500 capital account, but the distribution would have 
allowed K to avoid the tax burden of the corresponding $400 
precontribution gain. J, rather than K, ultimately would have borne such 
tax burden, for example, following the property’s sale.160  
  
 155 I.R.C. § 731(a)-(b) (2006). 
 156 Id. §§ 721(a), 722. 
 157 Id. § 723. 
 158 Id. § 731(a)(1), (b). 
 159 Id. §§ 732(a)(1), 733. If a partnership distributes property to a partner, the partner 
takes a basis in the distributed property equal to the partnership’s inside basis in such property 
immediately prior to distribution. The partner’s outside basis is then reduced by the basis she takes 
in the distributed property.  
 160 Like many of the income and loss shifts discussed in this Article, this income shift 
would have been temporary and would have reversed itself following the liquidation of the 
partnership or J’s disposition of her partnership interest. However, as discussed supra Part I.B.1, 
these shifts are incredibly problematic despite their temporary nature.  
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Congress enacted the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule to 
curtail this transaction.161 Under current law, if a partner contributes 
property to a partnership and the partnership later distributes the property 
to another partner, the contributing partner must recognize all or a 
portion of such property’s precontribution gain or loss at distribution.162 
In so doing, the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule prevents the 
shifting of many precontribution gains and losses. Section 704(c)(1)(B)’s 
application, however, has limitations. Most importantly, this mixing 
bowl rule only applies to property distributions occurring within seven 
years of such property’s contribution to the partnership.163 
b. Avoidance Transaction #2: Nonrecognition on Property 
Exchanges  
Distributions also allowed partners to avoid the recognition of 
gain or loss on transactions that, in substance, constituted property 
exchanges. If a partner contributed property to a partnership and 
subsequently received a distribution of different property, the partner 
could achieve a result likely impossible outside the partnership—a tax-
free property exchange.164 To illustrate, reconsider Example 3. After 
formation, assume that the partnership purchased a baseball card for 
$500. If the partnership distributed the baseball card to K, no gain or loss 
would have been recognized, and K’s basis in the baseball card would 
have been $100.165 By using the partnership as a conduit, K effectively 
would have exchanged Orangeacre for the baseball card without 
recognizing Orangeacre’s $400 built in gain. By contrast, if K would 
have exchanged Orangeacre and the baseball card directly, she would 
  
 161 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7642, 103 Stat. 
2106 (1989) (codified at I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)). For a detailed discussion of the Section 704(c)(1)(B) 
mixing bowl rule, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, ¶ 11.04[4].  
 162 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)(i). If contributed property is distributed to a partner other than 
the contributing partner within seven years of its contribution, Section 704(c)(1)(B) requires the 
contributing partner to recognize a gain or loss. The gain or loss recognized is computed based on a 
hypothetical sale of the contributed property for its fair market value at the time of distribution. 
Specifically, the amount of gain or loss recognized equals the precontribution gain or loss that the 
contributed partner would have been allocated under Section 704(c)(1)(A) on such hypothetical sale. 
Id. To illustrate, consider the application of Section 704(c)(1)(B) to Example 3. Assuming the 
partnership distributes Orangeacre to J within seven years of contribution, K would recognize a $400 
gain on the property’s distribution. That is, the partnership would recognize $400 on the hypothetical 
sale of Orangeacre ($500 amount realized minus $100 inside basis), and allocate the entire gain to K 
under Section 704(c)(1)(A).  
 163 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B). Additionally, Section 704(c)(1)(B) does not necessarily require 
the contributing partner to recognize her entire precontribution gain or loss. As discussed supra note 
162, the amount recognized by the contributing partner is determined based on a hypothetical sale of 
the contributed property at the time of distribution. If the contributed property’s fair market value 
has changed since contribution, the partnership may not recognize the entire precontribution gain or 
loss.  
 164 Property exchanges are generally subject to tax, but a taxpayer will not recognize gain 
or loss on certain nonrecognition transactions, for instance transactions qualifying as a like kind 
exchange under Section 1031. 
 165 I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(1), (b), 732(a)(1), 733. 
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have recognized a $400 gain on Orangeacre’s disposition ($500 amount 
realized minus $100 basis).166 Accordingly, K would have avoided the 
recognition of Orangeacre’s $400 built in gain by structuring her 
exchange as a contribution followed by a distribution.  
Congress responded to this transaction by enacting the Section 
707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule and the Section 737 mixing bowl rule.167 
Under current law, if a partnership distributes property to a partner that 
previously contributed property to the partnership, then, to some extent, 
such partner must recognize the amount of gain or loss that she would 
have recognized on a direct exchange of the contributed and distributed 
properties.168 Like the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, these rules 
  
 166 I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
 167 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 73, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified 
at I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1937(a), 106 Stat. 2776 
(1992) (codified at I.R.C. § 737).  
 168 I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 737(a). Section 707(a)(2)(B) provides that if (1) a partner 
contributes property to a partnership, (2) the partnership distributes cash or property to such partner 
in a related transaction, and, (3) taken together, such transfers are properly characterized as a sale, 
then such contribution and distribution will be treated as a sale between unrelated parties. Id. 
§ 707(a)(2)(B). Section 707(a)(2)(B) treats the sale as occurring on the date that the partnership is 
considered to be the owner of the contributed property. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(a)(2) (1992). A 
contribution followed by a distribution will be treated as a sale if the partnership would not have 
made the distribution but for the partner’s contribution of property, and to the extent the contribution 
and distribution do not occur simultaneously, the distribution is not dependent on the entrepreneurial 
risk of the partnership. Id. § 1.707-3(b)(1). This disguised sale determination is made based on all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the Section 707(a)(2)(B) regulations 
contain a list of ten factors to be accounted for when making such determination. Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2). 
In addition, the Section 707(a)(2)(B) regulations contain two rebuttable presumptions regarding sale 
characterization. First, if the contribution and distribution occur within a two-year period, such 
transactions will be presumed to be a sale. Id. § 1.707-3(c)(1). Second, by contrast, if the 
contribution and distribution occur more than two years apart, such transactions will be presumed 
not to be a sale. Id. § 1.707-3(d). To illustrate consider Section 707(a)(2)(B)’s application to 
Example 3. If K contributed Orangeacre and, within a two-year period, the partnership distributed 
the baseball card to her, such transactions would be treated as a sale unless the facts and 
circumstances clearly established otherwise. Since the transactions are not simultaneous, K would be 
deemed to exchange Orangeacre for the partnership’s obligation to transfer to her the baseball card 
in the future, and such sale would be deemed to occur on the date K contributed Orangeacre to the 
partnership. Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2), (f) ex. 3. For a detailed discussion of the Section 707(a)(2)(B) 
disguised sale rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, ¶ 14.02[3][b]. 
  The Section 737 mixing bowl rule requires a contributing partner to recognize a gain if 
she receives a distribution within seven years of her contribution. I.R.C. § 737(a), (b). Specifically, 
the contributing partner recognizes a gain equal to the lesser of: (1) the excess of the distributed 
property’s fair market value plus any cash distributed over the contributed partner’s outside basis 
and (2) the contributing partner’s net precontribution gain. Id. § 737(a). The contributing partner’s 
net precontribution gain equals the net gain that the contributing partner would recognize under the 
Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule if the partnership distributed all the property that such 
contributing partner had contributed to the partnership in the seven years preceding distribution. Id. § 
737(b). For a discussion of the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, particularly the computation 
of any gains and losses recognized, see supra note 162. The Section 737 mixing bowl rule only 
applies to a transaction to the extent that the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule does not apply. 
To illustrate, assume that the partnership in Example 3 distributes the baseball card to K in the fifth 
year following Orangeacre’s contribution. Under Section 737, K would recognize a $400 gain on 
such distribution. The excess of the baseball card’s fair market value over K’s outside basis equals 
$400 ($500 fair market value minus $100 outside basis), and K’s net precontribution gain equals 
$400. For a detailed discussion of the Section 737 mixing bowl rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., 
supra note 12, ¶ 19.08.  
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are imperfect solutions. Both the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule 
and the Section 737 mixing bowl rule expire after a period of years.169 
Further, the Section 737 mixing bowl rule fails to ensure that the 
contributing partner will recognize the contributed property’s entire built 
in gain or loss following disposition.170  
c. Abuses Eliminated: The Deferred Sales Method 
The deferred sales method would eliminate these avoidance 
transactions, thereby rendering the foregoing anti-abuse rules extraneous. 
Accordingly, Congress could repeal the Section 704(c)(1)(B) and Section 
737 mixing bowl rules and the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule. 
As discussed, the deferred sales method would quarantine a 
contributing partner’s precontribution gains or losses in her deferred 
sales amount.171 Accordingly, the contributing partner, and only the 
contributing partner, would recognize such precontribution gains or 
losses. Put another way, a partnership could not shift built in gains or 
losses from the contributing partner to another partner through 
distributions and, therefore, the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule 
would no longer be necessary.  
The deferred sales method also would preclude avoidance 
transactions intended to disguise a property exchange. Under the deferred 
sales method, the contributing partner would recognize her deferred sales 
amount when she received a distribution or the partnership distributed 
the contributed property. Accordingly, distributions could no longer 
camouflage taxable property exchanges because they too would trigger 
recognition of the contributed property’s built in gains or losses.172 
Because the contributing partner would recognize her deferred sales 
  
 169 As discussed supra note 168, the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule contains a 
two-year presumption regarding sale characterization and the Section 737 mixing bowl rule only 
applies to distributions occurring within seven years of a contribution. I.R.C. § 737(a), (b)(1); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.707-3(c), (d). 
 170 The Section 737 mixing bowl rule only requires a contributing partner to recognize 
precontribution gains on a partnership distribution; it does not apply to precontribution losses. I.R.C. 
§ 737(a). Even with respect to precontribution gains, this rule does not ensure that the contributing 
partner recognizes her entire precontribution gain. As discussed supra note 168, the contributing 
partner’s recognized gain is the lesser of two amounts. The first amount is computed by reference to 
the contributing partner’s outside basis, which may reflect amounts other than the contributed 
property. The second amount is computed by reference to the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl 
rule. As discussed supra note 162, the Section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule does not ensure that 
the contributing partner recognizes the property’s entire precontribution gain.   
 171 See supra Part II.B.1.  
 172 As discussed supra note 149, a partner may only recognize a portion of her deferred 
sales amount following receipt of a distribution. However, this partial recognition does not affect the 
foregoing conclusion that the deferred sales method would provide a more comprehensive solution 
to these avoidance transactions. Indeed, if the contributing partner recognizes a portion of her 
deferred sales amount following a distribution, the amount recognized would be computed by 
reference to the amount of gain or loss that would have been recognized on a partial sale of the 
contributed property. Accordingly, even partial recognition of the deferred sales amount would 
properly address the concern underlying these avoidance transactions.  
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amount no later than a subsequent triggering distribution, the Section 
707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule and the Section 737 mixing bowl rule no 
longer would be required to prevent these avoidance transactions.    
The deferred sales method would require no supplemental anti-
abuse rules to prevent the use of partnership contributions and 
distributions to avoid the recognition of precontribution gains and losses. 
Indeed, the deferred sales method would offer a more comprehensive 
means of combating these avoidance transactions than the mixing bowl 
and disguised sale rules. Unlike these provisions, the deferred sales 
method would not be subject to time restrictions or recognition 
limitations; any future distribution would trigger the contributing 
partner’s recognition of the deferred sales amount. 
Accordingly, Congress could repeal the Section 704(c)(1)(B) and 
Section 737 mixing bowl rules and the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised 
sales rule, thereby simplifying Subchapter K. The absence of these 
complex anti-abuse rules would increase administrability, promote 
compliance, and allow Treasury to redirect scarce enforcement resources 
to alternative areas of Subchapter K. Simply put, the deferred sales 
method would transform Subchapter K into a more harmonious and less 
complex system of taxation.173 And the deferred sales method is unique 
in this respect. No other Section 704(c) allocation methodology offers 
Subchapter K these rewards.      
  
 173 The deferred sales method would also streamline the Section 754 election regime, 
discussed in greater detail infra notes 184-191, particularly the computation of the Section 743(b) 
special basis adjustment. When a partner purchases a partnership interest, the partnership generally 
does not adjust the inside basis of its property to reflect such transaction. I.R.C. § 743(a). However, 
if a partnership has a Section 754 election in effect, the partnership must adjust the inside basis of its 
property following a partner’s sale of her partnership interest. Id. § 743(b). Additionally, Congress 
amended these rules in 2004 to require a partnership to make a Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment if the partnership has a substantial built in loss following the sale of a partnership 
interest. Id. § 743(b), (d) (providing that a partnership has a substantial built in loss if the basis of its 
property exceeds such property’s fair market value by more than $250,000). The Section 743(b) 
special basis adjustment aims to provide the purchaser of a partnership interest with a cost basis in 
her share of the partnership’s property. The partnership computes the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment based on a series of computations, the most important of which is a hypothetical sale of 
all of the partnership’s assets at fair market value in a fully taxable transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-
1(d)(2) (as amended in 2004). The partnership must then allocate such hypothetical gains and losses 
to the purchasing partner. Id. § 1.743-1(d)(1)(ii), (iii). Like any sale, hypothetical or otherwise, 
Section 704(c) must be accounted for in allocating these gains and losses. Id. § 1.743-1(d)(1), (3) ex. 
2. Under current law, a partnership may simultaneously have to apply four allocation methodologies 
with respect to contributed property, and a different methodology for the remaining allocations. By 
contrast, if Congress adopted the deferred sales method, a partnership would allocate all gains and 
losses, whether attributable to contributed or non-contributed property, under the general Section 
704(b) allocation rule. Given the legendary complexity of the Section 754 regime and its recent 
expansion, the streamlining of the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment’s computation through the 
application of a unitary allocation rule would represent a welcome and significant step towards the 
simplification of Subchapter K. For a detailed discussion of the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, ¶ 24.02; see also Marich & McKee, supra 
note 82, at 686-90. 
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III. THE HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEFERRED SALES 
METHOD 
Throughout the years, Congress and commentators alike have 
carefully considered, but rejected, the deferred sales method.174 Congress 
and many commentators objected to the deferred sales method because 
of its reliance on asset valuation and perceived complexity. Moreover, 
some commentators feared that the deferred sales method would erode 
the nonrecognition principles underlying partnership contributions.   
Although one could debate whether any of the foregoing 
objections should have been persuasive when Section 704(c)’s reform 
was previously considered, these objections are not persuasive today. 
Concerns regarding valuation, complexity, and nonrecognition do not 
present insurmountable obstacles to the adoption of the deferred sales 
method. Indeed, none of these historic objections provides a compelling 
argument against the adoption of the deferred sales method, particularly 
when considered in light of the current Section 704(c) crisis.      
A. Valuation 
As discussed supra, the deferred sales method’s dependence on 
asset valuation troubled the A.L.I. in 1984.175 Unlike other allocation 
methodologies, the deferred sales method would require the partnership 
to determine the fair market value of all contributed property. The A.L.I. 
feared that this requirement would prove burdensome to many 
partnerships and would allow sophisticated partnerships additional 
opportunities for strategic behavior.176  
  
 174 See T.D. 8501, 1994-1 C.B. 191 (finalized by T.D. 8585, 60 Fed. Reg. 11,906); 1984 
A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 129; Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50, at 120-23. 
Nonetheless, many commentators have recommended the deferred sales method’s adoption. See 
1985 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 77 (recommending that any regulations issued under Section 
704(c) permit taxpayers to use the deferred sales method); Karen Burke, Disguised Sales Between 
Partners and Partnerships: Section 707 and the Forthcoming Regulations, 63 IND. L. J. 489, 532 
(1988) (proposing adoption of deferred sales method, but only in conjunction with reform of the 
rules governing partnership distributions); Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 82, at 13-14; 
Marich & McKee, supra note 82, at 636; Turlington, supra note 135, ¶ 26.08 (supporting the repeal 
of the ceiling rule).  
 175 Supra Part I.C.4; see also 1985 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 77 (“The Committee 
is concerned by the requirement of section 704(c) that each asset be valued where it is contributed to 
a partnership, even when tax avoidance is unlikely.”); Steines, supra note 82, at 670.  
 176 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 131-36. The A.L.I. raised several valuation 
objections to the deferred sales method. First, the deferred sales method’s valuation requirement 
could affect the relative tax burden of the partners, and the partners might not anticipate this result if 
they were otherwise indifferent to valuation. To illustrate, assume two individuals organize a 
partnership with each contributing property. The partners agree that the properties are of equal value, 
but they do not establish a value for such properties. Rather, the partners agree that the value of the 
two properties falls within a certain range. One of the contributed properties is rental property, and 
the partnership expects such property to generate a fixed amount of annual income without regard to 
its valuation. Although such income is expected to remain constant, the tax burden of such fixed 
income under the deferred sales method will vary depending on the valuation of the contributed 
property. Specifically, as the valuation increases, so too does the partnership’s depreciation and the 
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Although the A.L.I. found this valuation argument compelling, it 
no longer remains so. Without regard to contributed property, valuation 
plays a critical role in partnership allocations. Since the issuance of the 
Section 704(b) substantial economic effect regulations in 1983, valuation 
has come to permeate the infrastructure of Section 704.177 For instance, 
the rules governing capital account maintenance, which a partnership 
must satisfy in order to establish the substantial economic effect of its 
allocations, require that a partnership record all property in the relevant 
partner’s capital account at its fair market value at contribution.178  
More generally, valuation is integral to the proper alignment of 
Subchapter K and the Substance Principle. If the tax consequences of an 
investment must parallel the corresponding economic consequences of 
such investment, as the Substance Principle commands, Subchapter K 
must adopt a benchmark measure of economic investment. Fair market 
value, as reflected in the partners’ capital accounts, is the natural choice. 
B. Complexity 
Throughout the years, complexity has been a formidable obstacle 
to the deferred sales method’s adoption. Indeed, many commentators 
believed that the deferred sales method was too complicated for most 
partnerships.179 Yet, as will be discussed, the deferred sales method’s 
similarities to current law and the ongoing crisis in Section 704(c) have 
rendered these complexity objections wholly unpersuasive.  
Early opponents of the deferred sales method believed that the 
requirement that a partnership maintain separate sets of financial records 
  
contributing partner’s deferred sales amount. Accordingly, the contributing partner would bear a 
larger share of the rental property’s income. Put another way, although the partnership’s fixed 
income remains constant, the distribution of such income between the partners will change based on 
the contributed property’s valuation. Second, the deferred sales method’s valuation requirement 
creates opportunities for abusive behavior. If the partnership’s valuation of the contributed property 
is presumed correct, the partnership may inflate or deflate such value to achieve a tax-advantaged 
result. For instance, the deferred sales method may create an incentive to inflate the fair market value 
of contributed property in order to obtain increased depreciation deductions. While the potential 
certainly exists, such opportunities exist any time a partnership, or any taxpayer, acquires property. 
Indeed, concerns regarding the opportunistic use of valuation are not unique to partnership 
allocations or to Subchapter K. Abuses related to improper valuation arise in numerous contexts 
throughout the federal tax system and the deferred sales method’s adoption should not be rejected 
simply because it presents an opportunity for abuse endemic to the federal income tax system.  
 177 For a discussion of the substantial economic effect safe harbor, see supra notes 13-14 
and accompanying text. See also Burke, supra note 174, at 530; Turlington, supra note 135, § 26.08.  
 178 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d) (as amended in 2008). 
 179 See, e.g., Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50, at 122-23; 1984 A.L.I. 
PROJECT, supra note 76, at 136-38; 1994 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (“The deferred sales 
method had the potential to be quite complex, and it raised a number of difficult questions relating to 
the proper treatment of contributed property that is subsequently disposed of by the partnership in a 
nonrecognition transaction.”); DCBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (“[W]e believe that the deferred 
sale method is far too complex and full of traps for the unwary to be required for use by all 
partnerships.”). 
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was overly cumbersome.180 However, like the valuation concerns 
previously discussed, the issuance of the Section 704(b) substantial 
economic effect regulations in 1983 effectively mooted this objection.181       
More recent criticisms have focused on the deferred sales 
method’s administrative and compliance challenges, particularly those 
related to the deferred sales amount.182 Commentators believed that the 
deferred sales amount imposed unique administrative obligations on 
partnerships and their partners. For instance, the deferred sales method 
would require partnerships to monitor the deferred sales amount annually 
to determine whether a triggering event, including depreciation, had 
occurred. If such an event had occurred, a series of secondary issues 
would then require consideration: computing the portion of the deferred 
sales amount recognized, adjusting the contributing partner’s outside 
basis, and reporting any recognized gains or losses. In addition, 
commentators questioned who would be primarily responsible for 
complying with these requirements—the partnership or the contributing 
partner. These commentators believed that Subchapter K’s existing 
complexity presented sufficient challenges to partnerships, but any shift 
of the compliance burden from the partnership to the contributing partner 
also would be undesirable.183   
Contrary to these commentators’ views, however, the deferred 
sales method’s most novel feature—the deferred sales amount—has 
significant roots in Subchapter K. In many respects, the deferred sales 
amount parallels the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment, and, as will 
be discussed, this shared sensibility would eliminate many of the 
complexity objections to the deferred sales method. Indeed, Subchapter 
K’s extensive experience with Section 743(b) refutes the objection that 
the deferred sales method would present new challenges for partnership 
taxation. 
  
 180 Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50, at 122. The A.L.I. in 1954 was so 
intent on avoiding multiple sets of books that it proposed that partnerships make contributed 
property allocations under the transference of basis approach, discussed supra note 51. In support of 
its recommendation, the A.L.I. cited anecdotal evidence regarding taxpayer compliance with and 
government enforcement of the modified partial deferred sales method applied in General Counsel 
Memorandum 10092, discussed supra note 77. Specifically, the A.L.I. noted that both taxpayers and 
revenue agents found partial deferred sales method difficult to comprehend and, therefore, rarely 
followed the rules as specified in the memorandum.  
 181 See supra note 177 and accompanying text; see also Turlington, supra note 135, 
§ 26.08. 
 182 See, e.g., 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 136; 1994 NYSBA COMMENTS, 
supra note 115 (“The remedial method represents an innovative solution to those problems. It also 
should result in a higher compliance level than the deferred sale method, since all relevant tax items 
presumably will be reflected on the Schedule K-1s prepared by the partnership (as opposed to the 
deferred sale method under which the individual partners would have had to ascertain the tax 
consequences to them outside the partnership).”); DCBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (expressing 
strong reservations regarding the deferred sales method’s use by unsophisticated partnerships).  
 183 See 1994 NYSBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (expressing reservations regarding the 
wisdom of shifting any compliance burden from the partnership to the partners). 
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In certain circumstances, the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment allows a partner purchasing a partnership interest to adjust 
her basis in the partnership’s property to more properly reflect such 
property’s fair market value at the time of the purchase transaction.184 Put 
another way, the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment provides the 
purchasing partner additional basis in the partnership’s property that, 
when added to or subtracted from her share of the partnership’s inside 
basis, is intended to give her a cost basis in such property.185 The 
purchasing partner’s special basis adjustment equals the difference 
between her outside basis and her share of the partnership’s inside basis 
in its property.186 This aggregate special basis adjustment is then 
allocated among the partnership’s property and, hence, the purchasing 
partner has a Section 743(b) special basis adjustment in each item of 
partnership property.187 
When a taxable event occurs with respect to the partnership’s 
property, the purchasing partner determines her tax consequences by 
accounting for the portion of the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment 
allocated to such property. To illustrate, if a partnership sold property 
and allocated the resulting tax gain between its partners, a purchasing 
partner with a positive Section 743(b) special basis adjustment 
attributable to the sold property would reduce her recognized gain by 
such special basis adjustment.188  
The Section 743(b) special basis adjustment only affects the 
purchasing partner’s tax consequences. Otherwise, the special basis 
adjustment is invisible to the partnership.189 Nonetheless, the partnership 
has primary responsibility for compliance with Section 743(b).190 To this 
  
 184 I.R.C. § 743(b) (2006). As discussed supra note 173, the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment does not apply to all purchasing partners. Rather, purchasing partners adjust their basis in 
the partnership’s property under Section 743(b) in two situations. The first is when the partnership 
has previously made a Section 754 election or will make such election for the taxable year of 
purchase. The second is when the partnership’s property has a significant built in loss at the time the 
partnership interest is purchased.  
 185 I.R.C. § 743(b)(1)-(2). The Section 743(b) special basis adjustment can be either 
positive or negative, depending on the changes in value of the partnership’s property. If, in the 
aggregate, the properties’ value has increased, the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment is 
positive. By contrast, if such properties’ value has decreased, the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment is negative. 
 186 For a more detailed discussion of the computation of the Section 743(b) special basis 
adjustment, see supra note 173. 
 187 Infra note 214 and accompanying text.  
 188 Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(j)(3)-(4) (as amended in 2004).  
 189 Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(j)(1) (as amended in 2004). 
 190 Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(k)(1)(i) (as amended in 2004). Following the sale of a 
partnership interest, the partnership must attach to its tax return for the year of transfer a statement 
including the following information: the name of the purchasing partner, the computation of the 
Section 743(b) special basis adjustment, and the partnership properties to which the Section 743(b) 
special basis adjustment is allocated. Additionally, the purchasing partner is required to notify the 
partnership of the sale within thirty days of its completion. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(k)(2)(i) (as 
amended in 2004). If the purchasing partner fails to provide such notice, the partnership is not 
required to make the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment or comply with the foregoing reporting 
requirements until the purchasing partner provides the required notice or the partner responsible for 
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end, the partnership identifies triggering events, determines the resulting 
tax consequences, and reports such information to the purchasing 
partner.191 
The deferred sales amount shares much in common with the 
Section 743(b) special basis adjustment. Similar taxable events, 
including dispositions and depreciation, trigger the deferred sales amount 
and the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment. Once triggered, both the 
deferred sales amount and the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment 
are personal to the relevant partner. Neither mechanism has any effect on 
the partnership or the other partners. Further, the deferred sales amount 
and the special basis adjustment raise parallel bookkeeping and 
compliance concerns. Thus, it would be easy for Treasury to follow the 
model adopted by Section 743(b) when drafting the deferred sales 
method’s compliance rules.  
Simply put, the feature of the deferred sales method typically at 
the center of complexity objections—the deferred sales amount—is not 
unique. On the contrary, the deferred sales amount strongly resembles 
the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment. Accordingly, Subchapter 
K’s considerable experience with Section 743(b) moots many 
commentators’ complexity objections to the deferred sales method.192 
More generally, complexity objections to the deferred sales 
method are more nostalgic than substantive. Each time Congress or 
commentators have considered the deferred sales method, they invariably 
have conceded that the federal income tax system, particularly 
Subchapter K, has grown increasingly complex.193 This admission is even 
truer today. Accordingly, concerns about the deferred sales method’s 
  
federal income tax reporting has knowledge of the transfer. Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(k)(4) (as amended 
in 2004).   
 191 The instructions for Form 1065 provide that “[i]f the basis of partnership property has 
been adjusted for a transferee partner under section 743(b), the partnership must adjust the 
transferee’s distributive share of the items of partnership income, deduction, gain, or loss in 
accordance with Regulations section 1.743-1(j)(3) and (4).” Instructions to U.S. Return of 
Partnership Income, Form 1065, 9 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1065.pdf. “These 
adjustments . . . must be reported on Schedule K and the transferee partner’s Schedule K-1.” Id. 
 192 In addition, the deferred sales method would not disrupt Section 704(c)’s current 
theoretical balance between the aggregate and entity theories of partnerships. As discussed supra 
note 58, current law reflects a blend of aggregate and entity principles. The foundational rule that a 
partnership should allocate items attributable to contributed property in a manner sensitive to their 
precontribution or postcontribution nature is fundamentally an aggregate principle. Yet the ceiling 
rule infuses entity principles into Section 704(c). Similarly, the deferred sales method is a hybrid of 
aggregate and entity principles, as discussed supra note 80. It applies an entity approach to 
partnership contributions, but requires partnerships to allocate items according to aggregate 
principles.  
 193 See, e.g., 1984 A.L.I. PROJECT, supra note 76, at 138 (admitting that the complexity 
that was viewed as overwhelming in 1954 may no longer be so extreme); Burke, supra, note 174, at 
530; Marich & McKee, supra note 82, at 686 (noting that even though the deferred sales method was 
“once considered unduly complex,” such method would serve as the “tonic” for the truly complex 
sections of Subchapter K); Turlington, supra note 135 (“Simplicity as an objective of Section 704 is 
a policy goal long since abandoned. One need only read the Regulations under Section 704(b) and 
ponder the Treasury’s continuing difficulties promulgating Regulations under Section 704(c) to 
reach that conclusion.”).  
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complexity are no longer persuasive and should not prevent 
congressional reform of the rules governing allocations attributable to 
contributed property.  
Indeed, complexity is one of the most compelling reasons to 
adopt the deferred sales method. As discussed supra, the current Section 
704(c) regime suffers from matchless complexity.194 And the deferred 
sales method offers Congress an invaluable opportunity to simplify 
partnership allocations and, more broadly, Subchapter K. 
C. Erosion of the Nonrecognition Regime Governing Contributions 
Throughout Subchapter K’s history, nonrecognition principles 
have governed partnership contributions.195 Precontribution gains and 
losses are preserved for future recognition, but the contributing partner 
recognizes no gain or loss at the time of contribution.196 Two theories 
support this nonrecognition. The first is a belief that the contributing 
partner’s underlying investment is continuing, albeit in a changed 
form.197 Accordingly, recognition of any precontribution gains or losses 
at contribution would be inappropriate. The second is a concern that the 
contributing partner’s immediate recognition of precontribution gains or 
losses would deter partnership contributions.198 
Because the deferred sales method might accelerate the 
recognition of precontribution gains and losses in certain circumstances, 
commentators have argued that the method would impermissibly erode 
the nonrecognition principles governing partnership contributions.199 In 
so arguing, these commentators have focused principally on two aspects 
of the deferred sales method. First, the deferred sales method would 
expand the universe of events triggering recognition of the contributing 
partner’s built in gain or loss to include partnership distributions and the 
  
 194 See supra Part II.A. Indeed, Section 704(c)(1)(C) raises many issues subject to similar 
complexity objections. Thus, the deferred sales method’s rejection would not necessarily reduce the 
technical issues facing Treasury. For a discussion of these issues, see Jones, supra note 123; 
Rachuba, supra note 123. 
 195 See, e.g., Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1934); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 10,092, supra note 77. 
 196 For a more detailed discussion of the consequences of a partnership contribution, see 
supra Part I.A.  
 197 See Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra note 50, at 120. 
 198 Id.; see also Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 82, at 4; Lokken, Future Without 
Subchapter K, supra note 6, at 276. 
 199 See, e.g., DCBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (noting that the deferred sales method 
would conflict with the deferral regime of Section 721 because it requires a partnership to recognize 
gain or loss following an expanded list of taxable events); Jackson et al., 1954 A.L.I. Project, supra 
note 50, at 122-23; Marich & Hortenstine, supra note 134, at 1238 (“One must not overlook the fact 
that the repeal of the Ceiling Rule (or even a relaxation of such rule through an anti-abuse rule) is 
not simply the elimination of a regulatory rule of convenience—it is a substantial erosion of Sections 
703, 721, 722 and 723.”); Marich & McKee, supra note 82, at 651; Steines, supra note 82, at 654-
55; Turlington, supra note 135.  
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depreciation of contributed property.200 Second, the deferred sales 
method would require partners to recognize notional gains or losses not 
actually recognized by the partnership.201 As discussed supra, the 
deferred sales method effectively would divide the partnership’s 
recognized gains or losses into their component parts: the contributing 
partner’s deferred sales amount would reflect the precontribution 
component of such net gains or losses, and the remainder would reflect 
the postcontribution component.202 Thus, the gains or losses ultimately 
recorded on a partner’s income tax return would differ from the amount 
recognized by the partnership.  
Although the deferred sales method might accelerate the 
recognition of some precontribution gains or losses when compared to 
current law, this acceleration would not erode the nonrecognition rule 
governing partnership contributions. Thus, as will be discussed, erosion 
objections to the deferred sales method fail.203    
1. Interpretive Questions  
The erosion objection has several interpretive flaws that belie its 
conclusion regarding partnership contributions. First, the deferred sales 
method would not violate the literal language of Section 721, which 
contains the nonrecognition rule governing partnership contributions. 
Under this provision, no gain or loss is recognized on the contribution of 
property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. Put 
another way, Section 721 only grants nonrecognition treatment to the 
contribution transaction itself. The statute is silent on the timing of and 
triggers for the future recognition of such precontribution gains and 
losses. Consistent with Section 721, the deferred sales method would not 
require the recognition of any built in gains or losses at contribution. 
Accordingly, the deferred sales method would not conflict with the 
statutory nonrecognition rule governing partnership contributions.204 
  
 200 See, e.g., DCBA COMMENTS, supra note 115 (concluding that the deferred sales 
method “undermines this deferral regime by requiring that deferred gain or loss be triggered by 
events that do not include the partnership selling or exchanging the contributed property or by the 
partner selling or exchanging its partnership interest”); Turlington, supra note 135. Under current 
law, the contributing partner typically recognizes her precontribution gains or losses following the 
partnership’s sale of the contributed property or her sale of her partnership interest. 
 201 See, e.g., Turlington, supra note 135. 
 202 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 203 Taken one step further, one might question whether the erosion of the nonrecognition 
rule governing partnership contributions is even undesirable. Indeed, several commentators have 
advocated the elimination of the nonrecognition rules applicable to partnership contributions. See 
David R. Keyser, A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax: The Case of Partnership 
Formation, 5 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 269 (1986); Phillip F. Postlewaite, Thomas E. Dutton & Kurt R. 
Magette, A Critique of the A.L.I.’s Federal Income Tax Project—Subchapter K: Proposals on the 
Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 470-73 (1986). 
 204 See Turlington, supra note 135. 
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Second, the deferred sales method would not impugn any of the 
rationales supporting the nonrecognition of gains and losses on 
partnership contributions. As discussed, a contributing partner would not 
recognize precontribution gains or losses at the time of contribution 
under the deferred sales method. Thus, the deferred sales method would 
not compromise either of the rationales underlying nonrecognition—
continuity of investment and deterrence. 
Lastly, the deferred sales method would not accelerate the 
recognition of precontribution gains and losses when compared to the 
general rules governing property exchanges. On the contrary, the 
deferred sales method would defer the recognition of such amounts. 
Although the deferred sales method might result in the accelerated 
recognition of some built in gains and losses when compared to current 
law, Subchapter K’s nonrecognition rules are not the proper baseline for 
comparison. Nonrecognition itself is an exception to the foundational tax 
principle that exchanges of property are taxable events.205 Absent Section 
721, partnership contributions would be subject to this general rule just 
like any other property transaction. Against this baseline, the deferred 
sales method would act as a deferral mechanism because it would not 
require the recognition of built in gains and losses at contribution. 
Indeed, the deferred sales method would perpetuate, rather than frustrate, 
the historic, tax-advantaged nature of partnership contributions. 
The deferred sales method would be consistent with the literal 
language of Section 721 and the rationales supporting its nonrecognition 
rule. In addition, the deferred sales method would continue to offer 
partners a deferral benefit when compared to the general rules governing 
property exchanges. Thus, the erosion objection invariably fails.  
2. The Erosion of the Nonrecognition Rule  
However, even if one disregards the foundational flaws of the 
erosion objection and considers its substantive merits, the conclusion 
remains unchanged——the erosion objection is not persuasive. Congress 
has long since eroded the nonrecognition rules governing partnership 
contributions. The deferred sales method simply represents the natural 
culmination of decades of congressional activity that has previously 
eroded this nonrecognition regime. The features of the deferred sales 
method perennially challenged by its opponents—the use of notional 
allocations and the expanded list of events triggering recognition of the 
deferred sales amount—are not new to Subchapter K. Rather, they are 
familiar tools that Congress has increasingly wielded in order to prevent 
abuse and better align Subchapter K and the Substance Principle.   
The current Section 704(c) allocation regime, for example, 
already includes both of these features. The remedial allocation method 
  
 205 I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2006); Treas. Reg § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 2007).  
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eliminates ceiling rule distortions through offsetting notional allocations 
to the noncontributing and contributing partners.206 Further, the remedial 
allocation method requires the incremental recognition of precontribution 
gains attributable to depreciable property, thereby expanding the 
universe of events triggering recognition of such precontribution 
amounts.207  
More importantly, Section 704(c)(1)(C) itself reflects a 
congressional willingness to erode Subchapter K’s nonrecognition rules. 
To illustrate, Section 704(c)(1)(C) requires a partnership to take an inside 
basis in contributed built in loss property equal to such property’s fair 
market value at contribution for purposes of making allocations to the 
noncontributing partner.208 Under this inside basis rule, the 
noncontributing partner recognizes amounts that differ from the amount 
actually recognized by the partnership.209 Accordingly, Section 
704(c)(1)(C) uses notional allocations to prevent the shifting of 
precontribution losses.210         
Beyond Section 704(c)’s parameters, Congress similarly has 
enacted provisions that include features challenged by the deferred sales 
method’s opponents. As discussed, the Section 704(c)(1)(B) and Section 
737 mixing bowl rules and the Section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule 
require the contributing partner to recognize her precontribution gains or 
losses following certain partnership distributions.211 Thus, these anti-
abuse rules already have expanded the universe of transactions triggering 
recognition of precontribution gains and losses to include partnership 
distributions. 
In addition, the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment relies on 
notional allocations to more equitably reflect the consequences of a 
purchase of a partnership interest. As discussed, Section 743(b) permits a 
purchasing partner to adjust her basis in the partnership’s property in 
order to give her a basis in such property that better reflects such 
property’s fair market value at the time she became a partner.212 To this 
end, the partnership computes the purchasing partner’s aggregate Section 
743(b) special basis adjustment, and such amount is then allocated 
among the partnership’s property under rules set forth in Section 755 and 
  
 206 See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.  
 207 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(1), (7) Example 1 (as amended in 2005).  
 208 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 209 See supra Part I.E. 
 210 As discussed supra note 131, one of the principle objections to a literalist 
interpretation of Section 704(c)(1)(C) is that such interpretation would require the noncontributing 
partner to recognize notional tax gains not actually recognized by the partnership. Simmons, supra 
note 18, manuscript at 55.  
 211 See supra notes 162, 168 and accompanying text. 
 212 For a general discussion of the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment, see supra 
notes 184-188 and accompanying text. 
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its corresponding regulations.213 Like the deferred sales method, these 
Section 755 allocation rules follow a netting approach. Indeed, the 
aggregate Section 743(b) special basis adjustment is broken into its 
component gains and losses, and such components are allocated among 
the partnership’s property.214  
Notwithstanding Congress’s increased willingness to limit the 
nonrecognition regime governing partnership contributions, one might 
argue that the deferred sales method still would represent a significant 
escalation in such congressional activity. The deferred sales method 
would be a mandatory allocation rule applicable to all contributed 
property. By contrast, the foregoing provisions are either elective at the 
partnership’s option or targeted anti-abuse provisions subject to 
expiration after a period of years.215 Even Section 704(c)(1)(C), which is 
mandatory when triggered, only applies to a limited universe of 
contributed property allocations.216 
Although the deferred sales method’s scope would be broader 
than prior congressional action, the deferred sales method would not 
represent an escalation in efforts to curtail nonrecognition. Throughout 
  
 213 Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1(b), (e) (as amended in 2004); id. § 1.755-1(b). For a discussion 
of the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment’s computation, see supra note 173. 
 214 Id. § 1.755-1(b)(1), (2)(ii) ex. 1. Section 755 and its corresponding regulations govern 
the allocation of the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment among the partnership’s property. Since 
1998, the Section 755 regulations require a partnership to apply a netting approach when allocating 
the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment among its property. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 4408 (Jan. 29, 1998). Treasury recognized that some partnership assets may have appreciated 
while others may have depreciated and, therefore, the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment should 
be broken into its component parts in order to more properly reflect the built in gains or losses 
existing at the time the purchasing partner acquires her partnership interest. As a result, the portion 
of the special basis adjustment allocated to a partnership asset may reflect either a positive or 
negative adjustment, so long as the sum of the adjustments equals the aggregate Section 743(b) 
special basis adjustment. Treasury adopted this netting approach under Section 755 for a familiar 
reason—the Substance Principle. Simply put, separating the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment 
into its component parts better aligned the tax and economic consequences attributable to a 
purchasing partner’s investment in the partnership. Indeed, Treasury noted in the preamble to the 
proposed Section 755 regulations that  
[u]nder the current regulations, the partnership may not increase the basis of assets that 
have a fair market value in excess of basis and, at the same time, decrease the basis of 
assets that have a basis in excess of fair market value. Thus, if the Section 743(b) 
adjustment is positive, the partnership may only increase the basis of assets that have a 
basis that is less than their fair market value. This restriction prevents the partnership 
from adjusting the basis of its assets in a manner that coordinates a transferee’s tax 
consequences with its economic consequences. The proposed regulations remove this 
restriction.  
Id.; see also Gergen, supra note 7, at 360; Lokken, As the World Turns, supra note 7, at 371. For a 
detailed discussion of the Section 755 allocation rules, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 12, ¶ 24.04.  
 215 The remedial allocation method is an elective means of addressing ceiling rule 
distortions. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(1) (as amended in 2005). Further, as discussed supra note 173, 
the Section 743(b) special basis adjustment is generally elective. The Section 704(c)(1)(B) and 
Section 737 mixing bowl rules and the Section 704(c)(2)(A) disguised sale rule are all mandatory 
anti-abuse rules. Nonetheless, each of these rules is subject to expiration following a period of years. 
See supra notes 125 & 168 for each provision’s expiration date.  
 216 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
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the years, Congress gradually has eroded the nonrecognition regime 
governing partnership contributions through reforms intended to prevent 
abuse and reintroduce the Substance Principle to Subchapter K.217 The 
deferred sales method is simply the next step in this evolution. Indeed, 
without regard to the fate of the deferred sales method, the 
nonrecognition rules governing partnership contributions have been, and 
will remain, compromised. Accordingly, erosion objections are 
especially unpersuasive and should not influence Congress’s 
consideration of the deferred sales method. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 704(c) no longer works. It is time for Congress to enact 
fundamental reform of the rules governing allocations attributable to 
contributed property by adopting the deferred sales method. It is time for 
the Substance Principle to reign supreme within Section 704(c).  
In fairness, Section 704(c) has never worked well. The balance it 
strikes between flexibility and the Substance Principle has always been 
problematic, never amounting to more than an uneasy truce between 
irreconcilable ideals. And the cost of Congress’s attempts to reconcile 
flexibility and the Substance Principle has been incredibly high. 
Maximizing partnership choice through multiple, elective allocation rules 
has increased complexity and opportunities for abuse throughout 
Subchapter K. Equally troubling, this balancing act has placed significant 
  
 217 As discussed supra note 80, the deferred sales method is entirely consistent with the 
balance between the aggregate and entity theories of partnerships currently reflected in Section 
704(c). Indeed, Congress has increasingly used this hybrid theoretical approach to prevent abuse and 
promote the Substance Principle. For instance, Section 704(c)(1)(C) reflects both aggregate and 
entity principles. Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s underlying allocation rule adopts the aggregate theory, but 
its treatment of the contribution transaction for purposes of the noncontributing partner follows the 
entity theory.  
  It is interesting to note that recent changes to the rules governing corporate 
contributions similarly blend aggregate and entity principles. The rules governing corporate 
contributions, like most of Subchapter C, follow an entity theory of taxation and treat a corporation 
as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. Unlike partnerships, corporations need not 
strive to allocate precontribution gains and losses to the contribution shareholder. Rather, 
corporations themselves are subject to tax on such amounts. However, Section 362(e)(2) infused 
aggregate principles into this entity-based contribution regime in order to prevent certain loss 
duplicating transactions similar to those spurring Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment in 2004, 
discussed supra note 123. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 836(a), 188 
Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 362(e)). When a shareholder contributes property to a 
corporation in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition treatment under Section 351, the 
corporation typically takes a basis in the contributed property equal to the shareholder’s basis in such 
property prior to the contribution. I.R.C. § 362(a) (2006). However, Section 362(e)(2)(A) provides 
an alternative rule if the corporation’s aggregate basis in the contributed property exceeds the 
aggregate fair market value of such property. Specifically, in these instances, the corporation’s 
aggregate basis in the contributed property shall not exceed the fair market value of such property. 
Consistent with the aggregate theory, this provision seeks to link a built in loss to the contributing 
shareholder and ensure that such shareholder, and not the corporation, receives the tax benefit of 
such precontribution loss.   
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strain on the allocations provisions that operate as the lifeblood of 
Subchapter K. 
Despite its fragile foundations, however, Section 704(c) has 
proven itself to be surprisingly durable. Nonetheless, it would be a 
mistake to assume that the rules governing allocations attributable to 
contributed property are capable of withstanding all challenges. And 
Congress made precisely this mistake when it enacted Section 
704(c)(1)(C) in 2004.          
Section 704(c)(1)(C) introduced unsustainable complexity into 
Section 704(c) at a time when external pressures were already 
jeopardizing the allocation regime’s continued viability. The explosive 
growth of business entities electing to be treated as partnerships for 
federal income tax purposes and the insufficient enforcement resources 
dedicated to Subchapter K have placed incredible stress on Subchapter 
K. Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s enactment significantly exacerbated this stress, 
and Subchapter K is now poised for a perfect storm.  
But this may be Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s saving grace. The 
disastrous effect of Section 704(c)(1)(C) requires congressional 
reconsideration of the rules governing allocations attributable to 
contributed property. Indeed, Section 704(c)(1)(C)’s failure compels 
Congress to answer the question it has skillfully avoided for decades. 
The time has come for Congress to decide what lies at the heart of 
Subchapter K flexibility or the Substance Principle. 
To some extent, Congress has already answered this question. 
Throughout the years, Congress has enacted various statutory provisions 
that better align Subchapter K and the Substance Principle. Section 
704(c)(1)(C) itself reflects Congress’s increased willingness to sacrifice 
flexibility in order to further compliance with the Substance Principle.  
Now Congress must take the next step. Congress must adopt the 
deferred sales method as the sole means of allocating items attributable 
to contributed property. In so doing, Congress would solve the problem 
of contributed property and solidify Section 704(c)’s commitment to the 
Substance Principle. The deferred sales method would dramatically 
reduce the abuses that have plagued Section 704(c) and streamline 
partnership allocations. Indeed, the deferred sales method would do the 
impossible. The deferred sales method would simplify Subchapter K. 
Simply put, the deferred sales method would save Subchapter K from 
itself.      
